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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius' has again fo-
cused widespread public attention on the role of the United States
Supreme Court as an active arbiter of the balance of power between
the federal government and the states. This has been an important
and controversial topic throughout American as well as Canadian
constitutional history, raising related questions of constitutional the-
ory for a federalist republic: Whatjustifies unelected judges interfer-
ing with the ordinary political process with regard to federalism ques-
tions? Can courts create judicially manageable doctrines to police
federalism, with anything more than the raw policy preferences of
five justices as to whether a particular legislative issue is best resolved
at the federal or state/provincial/local level? Do doctrines that limit
the ability of a national political majority to enact into law policy
preferences that are not shared by national political minorities who
constitute a majority in one or more states or provinces reflect a
country's constitutional values?
On three occasions since 1995, five-to-four majorities have held
that Congress's constitutional authority to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States"' did not authorize
statutes that a majority of federally elected representatives believed
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1 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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reflected sound policy and necessitated national legislation. The
reasoning in these cases was largely based on the majority's perceived
need to create some judicially-enforceable limit on federal initiatives,
to prevent Congress from "effectually obliterat[ing] the distinction
between what is national and what is local and creat[ing] a complete-
ly centralized government."'
These three recent decisions are somewhat inconsistent with a se-
ries of cases beginning in 1937 expansively interpreting the Com-
merce Clause to sustain much of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
New Deal legislation.' Federalism precedents from 1937 to 1995 (and
arguably the foundational interpretation of the Commerce Clause by
ChiefJustice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden6 ) rejected the need to
restrict the scope of Congress's enumerated powers in order to pre-
serve states' rights.7 Doctrinally, these New Deal decisions established
the principle that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
regulate intrastate activities with "a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce."' They were summarized, in a 1964 decision
upholding the use of the Commerce Clause to enact anti-
discrimination legislation, as holding that "the determinative test of
the exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is
simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is 'commerce
which concerns more States than one' and has a real and substantial
relation to the national interest."' Citing ChiefJustice Marshall, these
later decisions employ what I call "one-box federalism" reasoning:
3 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2566; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600-02 (2000); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550-51 (1995).
4 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)).
5 See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
6 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) ("If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power
over commerce ... is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single govern-
ment. . . .").
7 In upholding national minimum labor standards, the Court observed that Gibbons clearly
authorized such legislation, but the contrary Lochner-era decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918), that labor relations was a local matter, was an anomaly that
needed to be overruled. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1941). Ofcourse,
those who support an active role for the federal judiciary in narrowing Congress's power
do not accept this interpretation of Gibbons. See, e.g, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 593-99 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
8 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
9 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964); see also Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946) (holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate in "respect to what constitutes commerce, including whatever rightly




the Justices look to see if an activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, and, if it does, then Congress's power is as plenary as if
the country was a unitary state.'o To answer a question posed in the
opening paragraph, national majorities may impose their will over
contrary views of regional majorities that prevail in one or more state
legislatures, as long as the regulated activity has any significant effect
beyond state lines.
In today's integrated national economy, however, there is virtually
nothing left of what was, at the Founding, a major area of state legis-
lative competence: in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "com-
merce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man
and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and
which does not extend to or affect other States."" Reconsideration of
the reality of modern interstate economic integration has led Profes-
sor Donald Regan to observe that Americans "still do not have an ad-
equate theory of the commerce power." 2  Chief Justice Marshall's
doctrinal formulation no longer coheres with the current majority's
stated desire to develop a doctrine ofjudicially manageable standards
that can maintain a distinction between what is national and what is
local.'" But the majority's modification of Marshall's doctrine-
preserving congressional power to regulate activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce as long as the interstate effect can be
meaningfully distinguished from some area of activity preserved for
the states-leads to somewhat bizarre results. After Lopez, Morrison,
and Sebelius, intrastate activities with a relatively modest economic ef-
fect on interstate commerce-such as a restaurant serving a local cus-
tomer base that uses some ingredients purchased interstate-can be
regulated,14 presumably because these restaurants can be distin-
guished from non-commercial activity or local businesses that use
purely local ingredients. However, the decision by millions of Ameri-
cans not to purchase health insurance, with a staggering effect on the
10 Heart of Atlanta Mote 379 U.S. at 255 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97).
11 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
12 Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 554 (1995).
13 Chief Justice John Roberts conceded that the distinction he drew between permissible
regulation of those who choose to purchase insurance and impermissible regulation of
those who choose not to purchase insurance was likely indistinguishable to an economist.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012).
14 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (holding that racial dis-
crimination in private restaurants significantly burdens interstate commerce, thereby
bringing some activities within private, local restaurants into Congress's regulatory am-
bit). ChiefJustice Roberts favorably distinguished the Civil Rights Act's bar on discrimi-
nation by restaurant owners in McClung from Obamacare. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2590.
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cost of insurance premiums for others, cannot be regulated under
the Commerce Clause, because the majority of Justices could see no
principled way to distinguish this "non-activity" from any other non-
commercial decision by individual citizens. 5
In contrast to the checkered history of active judicial arbitration of
federalism disputes in the United States, Canadians seeking to chal-
lenge overreaching by the federal Parliament or provincial legisla-
tures have always had recourse to a judicial umpire. Broadly worded
constitutional text, allocating power to the federal Parliament to
"make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada"
and with regard to the "Regulation of Trade and Commerce," has
been explicitly modified to protect provincial prerogatives. In con-
trast to the American doctrine allowing Congress to regulate intra-
state activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, these two
broad grants of federal authority in the Canadian Constitution have
been narrowed to permit legislation only where Canadian justices are
satisfied that provincial legislatures cannot solve the problem and a
national solution is necessary. 7 The process by which a court narrows
a grant of power to the national government in order to ensure that
its exercise does not intrude on the legislative jurisdiction of a sub-
national legislature is what I call "two-box federalism." Complement-
ing this approach, Canadian courts inquire into the object and pur-
pose of legislation (its "pith and substance") to ensure that the
claimed anchor in an enumerated federal power is not pretextual.
15 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587; id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissent-
ing).
16 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 91 (U.K.). It was renamed
the Constitution Act, 1867, by the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), rernted in R.S.C. 1985,
app. II, no. 44 (Can.). As part of the repatriation of Canada's constitutional documents,
this statute was renamed the Constitution Act, 1867, by the Constitution Act, 1982, an act
of the Canadian Parliament incorporated into Schedule B of the Canada Act, c. 11
(U.K.). With respect to Canadian sensibilities, for the avoidance of confusion for Ameri-
can readers, I continue to refer to the 1867 statute by its original name.
17 See Gen. Motors of Can. Ltd. v. City Nat'I Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 643 (Can.) (allow-
ing the federal government to legislate under the trade and commerce power of section
91(2) only where "the provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable"
of legislating, and "the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a legisla-
tive scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the
country"). For the purposes of this article, which primarily discusses the Canadian Su-
preme Court, the Canadian Constitution, and its Framers, the Author has capitalized Ca-
nadian Constitution, Supreme Court, and Framers.
18 E.g., Reference reSec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, 868 (Can.).
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These doctrines remain vibrant not only because current judges
tend to follow long-established doctrine, 9 but also because they are
consistent with Canadian constitutional politics that views federalism
strategically: it is better to allow divergent provinces to adopt differ-
ent policies than to risk a national policy that may be substantively ob-
jectionable." In short, Canadians want to maintain a clear line be-
tween "what is national and what is local"2' because so many
Canadians perceive themselves as part of a national minority that is a
regional majority: lacking confidence that national majorities share
their values, Canadians prefer a more decentralized system of gov-
ernance. Because the Westminster system of responsible government
enforced by party discipline provides an insufficient check on federal
legislators to preserve this distinction, Canadians turn to the Supreme
Court to arbitrate federal-provincial issues of power allocation.
This Article summarizes the salient aspects of Canadian federalism
jurisprudence relevant to a comparative analysis, and draws insights
from the Canadian experience to shed light on current American
controversies. Part I offers some brief thoughts on the current state
of American constitutional doctrine, suggesting that it fails to achieve
the goal of a coherent and meaningful line between what is national
and what is local. Part II discusses the origins of Canadian constitu-
tional federalism and the significantly greater restraints that Canadi-
an judges impose on Parliament than American judges impose on
Congress. This reflects a consistent goal of protecting regional ma-
jorities that will always be national minorities, particularly French-
Canadians in Quebec. Part III traces significant differences between
Canada and the United States relevant to the question of judicial ar-
bitration of federalism disputes. Two key differences emerge. Unlike
the United States' demography, Canadian demography features a
large linguistic community that is a national minority but a clear ma-
jority in a large province. In addition, a number of institutional fac-
tors render Parliament less responsive to regional interests than Con-
gress. As a result, Canadians value provincial autonomy over the
long-run. In contrast, throughout the history of the United States,
the cause of "states' rights" has primarily been advocated by those
who happen to currently find themselves in a minority in Washington,
without any long-term view that they will remain a national political
19 See GERALD BAIER, COURTS AND FEDERALISM: JUDICIAL DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES,
AUSTRALIA, AND CANADA (2006).
20 See infra notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
21 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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minority. Americans confident that their views can prevail in Wash-
ington are not willing to strategically forego implementation of fa-
vored policies in deference to states' rights. Part IV analyzes two im-
portant aspects of Canadian constitutional doctrine that limit much
federal legislation to situations where provinces are unable to act,
suggesting that these doctrines reflect both historical and contempo-
rary Canadian constitutional values. Next, the Article questions
whether current American doctrine similarly reflects historical and
contemporary American federalism values. The Article suggests that
this comparative analysis presents American Justices with a clear op-
portunity to enhance the judicial manageability of federalism stand-
ards by borrowing two doctrines from north of the border. These
doctrines would significantly limit the ability of national majorities to
adopt legislation preventing national minorities that control one or
more state legislatures from enacting policies that, in the majority's
view, harm the welfare of the entire nation. The Article concludes by
questioning whether this importation reflects American constitution-
al values, and, if not, whether the search for a judicial standard to dis-
tinguish what is national and what is local should be abandoned.
I. SOME BRIEF OBSERVATIONS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
FEDERALISM AFTER SEBEIJUS
Federalism issues are hugely significant in their own right, but also
arise in the context of broader questions of constitutional politics in
each country. Perhaps the guiding project of recent American con-
stitutional history is the development of doctrines designed to limit
judicial discretion so as to inhibit results based on policy prefer-
ences." The concept of 'judicially manageable standards," it would
seem, derives in large part from the Supreme Court's desire to create
doctrines that can be applied by American judges without regard to
their own personal policy preferences, based on principles greater
than the ideology of five men and women currently on the Supreme
Court.
22 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICs 17 (1962) (arguing that judicial review "thwarts the will of repre-
sentatives of the actual people of the here and now"); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION 2 (2010) (describing the problem of constitutional law as to create doc-
trines that are "living, adapting, and changing and, simultaneously, invincibly stable and
impervious to human manipulation"); id. at 31 (observing originalist objections that "the
living Constitution is infinitely flexible and has no content other than the views of the
person who is doing the interpreting").
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A judicially manageable standard for the scope of Congress's pow-
er to regulate interstate commerce, initially set forth by ChiefJustice
Marshall, was a doctrine dividing the topics of legislation between
those with a substantial effect on other states and those activities
wholly internal to a single state. However, in the modern economy,
this division of legislative authority no longer provides any meaning-
ful distinction between matters that are national or local in scope. As
Justice Clarence Thomas has consistently observed, in modern times
the test permitting Congress to regulate activity that has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce is a "malleable standard" with "virtually
no limits.""
Another doctrinal standard that has seemed to find favor with re-
gard to the broad interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment focuses on the political process. Close
judicial scrutiny of legislation, with the attendant risks of judicial pol-
icymaking, is reserved in those cases for claims that state actors have
applied legislation differentially in a manner that, in the Court's view,
warrants "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.",4 Otherwise, the Court will find a violation of the equal pro-
tection guarantee only when the differential treatment of persons "is
so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate
purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were
irrational."" This is because, in the Court's view, the "Constitution
presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvi-
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process
and thatjudicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how
unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.""
In the trilogy of recent five-to-four decisions limiting congression-
al power to regulate interstate commerce, the dissenters appear to
embrace this view.27 Justice David Souter forcefully argued in Morn-
son that the majority's standard was not only incoherent but was also
23 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas,J., concurring).
24 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
25 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
26 Id. (footnote omitted).
27 This claim was articulated by Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543 (1954), expanded and developed by JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-A-Vis the States:
The Dispensability ofjudicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977), and adopted for the Court by
Justice Harry Blackmun in interpreting the Tenth Amendment in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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fundamentally flawed because the majority rejected "the Founders'
considered judgment that politics, not judicial review, should medi-
ate between state and national interests as the strength and legislative
jurisdiction of the National Government inevitably increased through
the expected growth of the national economy."2 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg noted that in addition to the doctrinal restraints imposed
by Lopez and Morrison, there "is a formidable check on congressional
power: the democratic process."2
The current majority, however, rejects that view. This was best ar-
ticulated in Lopez, where Justice Anthony Kennedy opined that the
political process lacked "structural mechanisms" to require federal
officials to observe an appropriate federal-state balance, adding that
"the momentary political convenience often attendant upon their
failure to do so [argues] against a complete renunciation of the judi-
cial role."o Based on the Supreme Court's role as final constitutional
arbiter" and the Sebelius majority's view of the original understanding
of the Framers, the majority sought to retain the Court's role as a
meaningful arbiter of constitutional politics-when it is not appro-
priate for a national majority to impose its policy preferences on a re-
gional majority. However, with the exception ofJustice Thomas, the
Justices have eschewed rejection of the substantial effects test. Ra-
ther, the test is retained, with the following additional exceptions:
(1) Congress's regulatory authority is limited to prohibitions or limits
on individuals' affirmative conduct (hence Sebelius held that Congress
cannot require a person to affirmatively purchase health insurance);
(2) the regulated conduct or activity must be commercial (hence,
Lopez held that Congress cannot directly proscribe gun possession
near a school and Morrison rejects congressional regulation of vio-
lence against women); and (3) the government's justification for na-
tional control must contain a limit that would preserve some matters
to local control.
28 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647 (Souter,J., dissenting).
29 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2624 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)
("[E]ffective restraints on [the commerce power's] exercise must proceed from political
rather than judicial processes.")). She further observed that the precedents re-affirmed
in Sebelius would permit Congress to outlaw both the purchase and home production of
any meat, fish, or dairy products, but that the prospect of a vegetarian state would notjus-
tify limiting congressional power over the sale of goods in an integrated economy. Id. at
2625.
30 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
31 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616-17 n.7.
32 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,JJ., dissenting).
898 [Vol. 16:4
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Jesse Choper, a critic of the heightened role of the Supreme
Court as a federalism umpire, has identified problems with the cur-
rent majority's efforts to achieve "an analytically sound and workable
standard" to delineate what is national and what is local.3 3 Choper
rightly observes that Lopez and Morrison sought to distinguish eco-
nomic/commercial activity and noneconomic/non-commercial mat-
ters,3 4 but that this is not much of a limit (Congress could criminally
punish or create federal tort actions for any wrongs that had any eco-
nomic component, including theft), and the standard is analytically
challenging in light of the law and economics movement's successful
effort to re-characterize many activities as having economic compo-
nents.5 One of Choper's colleagues and one of his former students,
Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel, subsequently argued that Article I,
Section 8 permits Congress to solve what economists call "collective
action problems," and that many economic activities that have some
effect on interstate commerce can be adequately regulated by each
state without affecting the general welfare, while regulation of some
noneconomic activity can generate significant collective action prob-
lems. 36
Likewise, an effort to distinguish national and local matters by
preserving for states those areas of legislative policy that have tradi-
tionally been exercised by the states is neither analytically sound nor
workable.7 As Choper notes, previous efforts to define "areas of tra-
ditional state concern" with regard to immunity from federal taxation
or Tenth Amendment protection from federal regulation were aban-
doned in failure. Indeed, accepting a basic precept of constitutional
federalism that the central government may legislate in areas where
sub-national governments are incompetent to do so, changing cir-
33 Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Fu-
ture Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 731, 736-37 (2003).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 737-38.
36 Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I,
Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 116 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
37 Indeed, even in the context of well-established "two-box federalism" that consciously
seeks to preserve areas of local control that have been specifically granted to sub-national
bodies by the Constitution, as in Canada, the claim that federal powers ought to be lim-
ited in this way has been harshly criticized. See 1 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF CANADA § 17.3(d) (5th ed. 2007) (looseleaf) (discussing the now-overruled decision in
The Queen v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R 984 (Can.), suggesting that Parliament's authority to
legislate under the peace, order, and good government (POGG) power was restricted to
"new" matters that had not been traditionally regulated by the provinces or the federal
government). Throughout this Article, citations of this source refer to Peter Hogg's 2007
two-volume edition, which is the most up-to-date edition available.
38 Choper, supra note 33, at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cumstances may require national legislation in areas traditionally left
to states. For example, federal legislation regulating industrial air
pollution is uncontroversial, but arguably state common-law-based
nuisance rules make even this area one of "traditional state regula-
tion" in the pre-industrial era.
Although the currently prevailing five-Justice majority that sup-
ports active judicial policing of federalism has insisted on standards
that draw distinctions between "what is truly national and what is truly
local,"" they have not articulated a clear basis for judges to draw that
distinction. To be sure, the divisions within their ranks on the ques-
tion of whether Congress has the constitutional authority to outlaw
home-grown marijuana for medical purposes suggests that Justices
are not pursuing short-term tactical political goals. 40  However, it is
difficult to identify the strategic constitutional politics, much less a
coherent and judicially manageable standard, in any of the Court's
tests for determining when national majorities may not impose their
will on national minorities who are majorities in one or more states.
The doctrine currently embraced by five of the Justices holds that
Congress may regulate almost all economic activity that has a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce, but not economic "inactivity" that
has a similar economic effect.4 1 Whatever its merits or demerits, this
doctrine utterly fails to serve the goal of distinguishing what is na-
tional from what is local. As Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Ginsburg both noted, the effect on interstate commerce that justifies
regulating inactivity lies in the harm caused by "free riding" by those
who do not engage in some desired economic activity.42 Congress
can, according to a shifting five-Justice majority, eliminate this prob-
lem by imposing a tax on free riders.4'3 The key question for federal-
ism-when can a national majority impose its will on a national mi-
nority that may be a majority in one or more states-is not implicated
here.
39 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
40 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Of the current five-four majority on federalism
issues, Justice Kennedy joined the Court's liberals in upholding a complete ban on mari-
juana possession and manufacture, deferring to Congress's judgment that deregulating
home-grown medical marijuana would affect the national marijuana market; Justice An-
tonin Scalia concurred because barring home-grown marijuana was necessary and proper
to accomplish the national ban on marijuana; Justice Thomas (joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and O'Connor,J.) dissented. Id. at 3-4.
41 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012); id. at 2643 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,JJ., dissenting).
42 Id. at 2594 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
43 Id. at 2594 (Roberts, C.J.).
[Vol. 16:4900
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The chosen doctrine-preserving Congress's ability to regulate in-
trastate activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
but only if the effect on interstate commerce that justifies federal leg-
islation contains a limiting principle-is neither a meaningful nor a
coherent limit on what is national and what is local. Advocates of
"two-box federalism" would do well to look elsewhere. Canada pro-
vides an insightful alternative.
II. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: ORIGINS AND CURRENT
DOCTRINE
The origins of Canadian federalism can be traced back to 1774.
As a revolutionary spirit was arising in the thirteen colonies that
would come to form the United States, the British Parliament enact-
ed the Quebec Act.45 Among its key provisions, the Act permitted
Catholics to participate in government, and permitted the Province
of Quebec to use French civil law to govern "Property and Civil
Rights" in the colony. (This term covers what English common law-
44 Another aspect of Sebelius that raises coherency problems is ChiefJustice Roberts's treat-
ment of the political process. The adverse effect on interstate commerce of economic in-
activity is the potential for inactive individuals to free ride, which is precisely why Con-
gress enacted the individual mandate in Obamacare. Id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The ChiefJustice makes the activity-inactivity
distinction workable, if not entirely coherent, by recognizing that Congress can address
the free rider problem by taxing inactive individuals. Id. at 2599 (Roberts, C.J.). The
conservative dissenters claim was not that taxing free riding non-insureds was beyond the
taxing power, but that Congress had not in fact intended the individual mandate to be a
tax; they noted the significant political costs that would have arisen if Congress had ex-
plicitly invoked the taxing power, and they concluded that this sort of explicit invocation
ought to be required. Id. at 2650-56 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito,JJ., dissenting).
The Chief Justice dismissed this argument with the general canon that statutes should be
interpreted to save their constitutionality. Id. at 2594 (Roberts, CI.). On the other hand,
when it came to the spending power, the majority held that Congress could not threaten
to withhold all federal funding for Medicaid to states that chose not to accept an expan-
sion of that program to cover median-income uninsured residents. Id. at 2606. Dissent-
ing, Justice Ginsburg correctly observed that, under the Court's precedents, Congress
could have constitutionally repealed Medicaid, adopted a new statute (I'll call it "Obama-
caid"), and imposed as a condition of acceptance of any Obamacaid funds that states ex-
pand the their previous coverage. Id. at 2635-36 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In apparent contradiction to his earlier reasoning, however, the
ChiefJustice dismissed Justice Ginsburg's observation in a footnote, noting that the pro-
cess of repealing Medicaid and reenacting an entirely new statute would entail significant
political costs, and implying that the judiciary properly imposes these costs on Congress
to ensure that conditional spending programs are not unduly coercive. Id. at 2605 n.12
(Roberts, C.J.).
45 R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 2 (Can.).
46 Id. section 8. The perception that the Act's strategic purpose was to facilitate the continu-
ing loyalty of French settlers to the British Crown upset Americans to the point that
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yers know as private law concerning contract, property, torts, wills,
and trusts.)47
In the 1860s, various arrangements to accommodate the Franco-
phone and Anglophone communities in the now-renamed Province
of Canada (roughly modern-day Ontario and Quebec) had proven
unsatisfactory, and there was growing sentiment for a union with the
then-separately administered colonies in modern-day Atlantic Cana-
da." Federalism provided the solution: an imperial statute, amenda-
ble only by the British Parliament, would allocate responsibilities be-
tween the federal and provincial governments. While the American
confederation was an aggregation of existing states, the major part of
the creation of the Canadian confederation was devolution: the divi-
sion of the unitary Province of Canada into two new provinces, Anglo-
dominated Ontario and Franco-dominated Quebec, with the addition
of two additional maritime provinces.4 ' As described by the leading
Quebecois newspaper, a complete union with a legislature appor-
tioned by population to reflect the Anglophone majority "cannot and
will not be accepted by the French Canadian population."o Such a
concept would put at risk the Quebecois' cherished civil law and reli-
gious institutions. However, the genius of what would become the
British North America Act of 186751 ("BNA Act") was to a Franco-
phone-majority province that put "under the exclusive control of
[Quebec] those questions which [the Quebecois] did not want the
fanatical partisans of [George Brown, the Liberal Party leader in On-
Thomas Jefferson included its passage as a grievance against King George III in the Dec-
laration of Independence. THE DECIARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (ex-
pounding that George III combined with the British Parliament to enact "pretended leg-
islation" for "abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighboring Province,
establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to ren-
der it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into
these Colonies.").
47 1 HOGG, supra note 37, § 21.2.
48 See, e.g., CANADA'S FOUNDING DEBATES (Janet Ajzenstat et al. eds., 1999), and specifically
SirJohn A. MacDonald's February 1865 speech, id. at 277-84. The Province of Quebec
had been divided by the Constitutional Act, 1791 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 3
(Can.), into Upper Canada and Lower Canada, separated by the present Ontario-Quebec
border. These two provinces were then fused into a single Province of Canada by the Un-
ion Act, 1840 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 4 (Can.); see 1 HOGc, supra note 37,
§ 2.3(b).
49 Ronald L. Watts, Federalism and Diversity in Canada, in AUTONOMY AND ETHNICHTY:
NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES 29 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000).
50 A.I. SILVER, THE FRENCH-CANADIAN IDEA OF CONFEDERATION, 1864-1900, at 37 (2d ed.
1997) (quoting LE COURRIER DU CANADA, Sept. 16, 1864) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).




tario] to deal with." Another "father of Confederation," Hector
Langevin, explained that all questions affecting Francophones as such
would be considered in Quebec City. Historian A.I. Silver summa-
rized these views: controversies assigned to the federal Parliament in
Ottawa would divide Canadians as liberals or conservatives but not by
nationality." Canada's founding document thus assigned to provinc-
es, among other things, exclusive power over "Property and Civil
Rights" and control of education subject to limited federal over-
sight.54 Consistent with Langevin's explanation, the document assigns
a broad range of economic matters to the federal Parliament.5
When we consider the views of the Quebecois supporters of con-
federation in conjunction with the much more centralizing vision of
the leader of confederation and Canada's first prime minister, Sir
John A. MacDonald, it is reasonably clear that the Fathers of Confed-
52 SILVER, supra note 50, at 40 (quoting RlfPONSES AU CENSEURS DE LA CONFEDERArION 47-
49 (1867)). Although not as authoritative as the American Federalit Papers, this primary
source material seems roughly analogous, reflecting a widely dispersed response by pro-
confederation advocates to critics.
53 SILVER, supra note 50, at 40. It is important to emphasize that Langevin's focus was on
how issues divided the Canadian people, not politicians. The notion that issues dividing
Canadians as "liberals or conservatives" were assigned to the national government as-
sumes that at any given time provincial officials might disagree. An issue would not di-
vide Canadians in these terms unless a clear majority in one or more provinces systemat-
cally and continuously favored one set of policies contrary to the national majority. The
historic example was the need to preserve the linguistic vibrancy of the Francophone
community; the modern example might be control of natural resources. In contrast with
this approach, the modern-day constitutional debates between Ottawa politicians who are
"nation-builders" and provincial politicians who are "province-builders" may be useful in
reshaping constitutional politics, but are not directly relevant to the question of the judi-
cial role in preserving areas of provincial autonomy. C(. Richard E. Simeon, Criteria for
Choice in Federal Systems, 8 QUEEN'S L.J. 131, 137-38 (1981). Indeed Professor Simeon
concedes that modern constitutional debates may be seen as bureaucratic competition ra-
ther than struggles among the citizenry. Id. at 141.
54 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, Sections 92(13), 93 (U.K). For a
discussion of a critical moment of Canadian constitutional politics involving Parliament's
authority to override provincial legislative choices regarding education, see infra notes
146-59 and accompanying text.
55 Section 91 of the BNA Act grants Parliament the authority over regulation of trade and
commerce (subsection 2), navigation and shipping (subsection 10), seacoast and inland
fisheries (subsection 12), inter-provincial or international ferries (subsection 13), curren-
cy (subsection 14), banking, paper money, and legal tender (subsections 15-16, 20),
weights and measures (subsection 17), bills of exchange and promissory notes (subsec-
tion 18), interest (subsection 19), bankruptcy and insolvency (subsection 21), and intel-
lectual property (subsections 22-23). British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3,
section 92 (U.K.). Section 92(10) exempts from provincial control, and grants to Parlia-
ment, authority over steamship lines, railways, canals, telegraphs, and other inter-
provincial "Works and Undertakings," international steamships, and other works that are
declared by Parliament to be "for the general Advantage of Canada." Id. at section
92(10).
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eration envisioned a federal government stronger than that which ex-
isted in the United States prior to the enactment of the Civil War
Amendments." However, until 1949, the final judicial arbiter of the
BNA Act was not the Supreme Court of Canada ("SCC") but a body
formally known as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in-
formally the "Law Lords," British judges appointed to that high office
to interpret the common law, domestic and imperial statutes enacted
by the British parliament, as well as "local" legislation enacted by the
parliaments of the Dominions and Colonies.
The Law Lords narrowly construed the scope of federal powers.
The drafters of the BNA Act were of course well aware of the lan-
guage of the United States Constitution, so the choice of words in as-
signing to the federal Parliament authority over "Trade and Com-
merce"58 must have reflected a considered decision to give Parliament
broader authority than Congress, whose economic regulatory power
only covered "Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sever-
al States."9 The Law Lords, however, explicitly held that the federal
power had to be narrowly construed so as to protect provincial power
over property and civil rights. Their Lordships (in a method of rea-
soning echoed over a century later by Justice Clarence Thomas60)
noted that the BNA Act explicitly assigned a variety of commercially
related matters to the Parliament, including shipping, banking, bills
of exchange, and bankruptcy, and thus reasoned that these provi-
sions would be superfluous if the words "Trade and Commerce" were
given their ordinary meaning. More importantly, to protect provin-
cial prerogatives, their Lordships held that federal and provincial
powers "must be read together, and the language of one interpreted,
and, where necessary, modified, by that of the other.",6  As a venerated Ca-
nadian Supreme CourtJustice, Lyman Duff, later explained,
The scope which might be ascribed to head 2, s. 91 (if the natural
meaning of the words, divorced from their context, were alone to be
considered), has necessarily been limited, in order to preserve from seri-
56 See, GARTH STEVENSON, UNFULFILLED UNION: CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND NATIONAL
UNITY 28 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing how MacDonald was convinced that the American
Civil War might have been avoided if state power had not been unlimited by the U.S.
Constitution).
57 For an overview, see I HocG, supra note 37, § 8.2.
58 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 91(2) (U.K).
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
60 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588-89 (1995) (ThomasJ., concurring).
61 Cf Citizens Ins. Co. of Can. v Parsons, [1881] 7 A.C. 96, 112 (U.K.P.C.).
62 Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
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ous curtailment, if not from virtual extinction, the degree of autonomy
63
which . . . the provinces were intended to possess.
This classic exemplar of what I call "two-box federalism" was illus-
trated in the judgment of Viscount Richard Haldane in In re Board of
Commerce Act, 1919, & the Combines & Fair Prices Act.64 Parliament had
extended price control legislation, initially enacted to respond to the
shortages created by World War I,6 to respond to concerns about
post-war price gouging. Notwithstanding the broad wording of sec-
tion 91(2) authorizing Parliament to legislate with regard to "Trade
and Commerce," and the lack of any serious suggestion that price
gouging was one of the matters that Cartier, Langevin, and other
Quebecois Framers feared subjecting to "fanatical partisans" in On-
tario," Haldane wrote that " [i]t is to the Legislatures of the Provinces
that the regulation and restriction of their civil rights6 ' have in gen-
eral been exclusively confided."6
The Law Lords were so vigilant in protecting provincial preroga-
tives from federal encroachment that a prominent Canadian consti-
tutional commentator labeled them as the "[W]icked Stepfathers of
Confederation."" The SCC has explicitly noted that in the years fol-
lowing the end of British appeals from their decisions, the trade and
commerce power has "enjoyed an enhanced importance."7  However,
the Canadian judiciary has adhered to some lasting principles their
Lordships articulated about respecting the diverse views of Canadi-
63 Lawson v. Interior Tree Fruit & Vegetable Comm. of Direction, [1931] S.C.R. 357, 366
(Can.) (quoted with approval in ReferencereSec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, 871 (Can.)).
64 In re Bd. of Commerce Act, 1919, & the Combines & Fair Prices Act, 1919, [1922] 1 A.C.
191 (U.K.P.C.).
65 The federal Parliament has traditionally been authorized to enact emergency measures in
wartime under the general authority of section 91 to enact measures relating to "peace,
order, and good government." British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, sec-
tion 91 (U.K.). This is described in I HOGG, supra note 37, § 17.4(b).
66 For a discussion of the massive economic changes wrought in the post-war period that led
to widespread concern that judicial resolution of private economic disputes was inade-
quate, see Bernard J. Hibbitts, A Bridle for Leviathan: The Supreme Court and the Board of
Commerce, 21 OTrAwA L. Riv. 65, 67-72 (1989).
67 In Canadian English, "civil rights" refers to private rights in dealing with others: the top-
ics of property, torts, contracts, etc. What Americans call "civil rights"-freedom from
discrimination, as reflected, for example, in the pathbreaking Civil Rights Act of 1964, is
called "human rights" in Canada. See, e.g., M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 168 (Can.) (de-
scribing prohibitions on employment discrimination based on sexual orientation in the
Canadian Human Rights Act and the human rights acts of each province).
68 Bd. of Commerce, [1922] 1 A.C. at 197 (footnote added).
69 See, e.g., Eugene Forsey, In Defence of Macdonald's Constitution, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 529, 529
(1976). This critique is not uncontroverted. See, e.g., Alan C. Cairns, The Judicial Commit-
tee and Its Critics, 4 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 301 (1971).
70 Gen. Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City Nat'l Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 659 (Can.).
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ans. Principally, Canadian judges continue to adhere to an im-
portant concept enunciated by the Law Lords:
In the case before them, however important it may seem to the Parlia-
ment of Canada that some such policy as that adopted in the two Acts in
question should be made general throughout Canada, their Lordships
do not find any evidence that the standard of necessity . .. has been
reached. . . .
Thus, the invigorated federal authority over trade and commerce still
features significant limitations. Current doctrine acknowledges that
judicial interpretation (1) does not correspond with the literal mean-
ing of the text, (2) includes international and interprovincial com-
merce (but does not include the authority to regulate intraprovincial
transactions that substantially affect such commerce72), and (3) cre-
ates a category called "general regulation of trade affecting the whole
dominion."" The final category permits a general regulatory scheme
that was overseen by a federal agency aimed at regulating trade as a
whole, but not any "particular business or trade." Moreover, federal
legislation in the third category is only permissible if the SCC is per-
suaded that the legislation is "of a nature that the provinces jointly or
severally would be constitutionally incapable" of legislating, and "the
failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a legislative
scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the scheme in
other parts of the country."
Indeed, in 2011 the SCC unanimously held that the trade and
commerce power did not authorize the federal Parliament to enact a
statute providing comprehensive regulation of the Canadian securi-
71 13d. of Commerce, [1922] 1 A.C. at 200-01 (emphasis added).
72 Professor Hogg describes the Privy Council decision in Toronto Electric Commissioners v.
Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 (U.ILP.C.), as rejecting the federal government's claim that gen-
eral aspects of the economy such as labor "were governed by economic forces that ig-
nored provincial boundaries" and thus intra vires the federal authority to regulate inter-
provincial commerce. 1 HOGG, sufpra note 37, at § 20.2(a). Hogg observes that "the
pervasiveness and interdependence of the legislations' subject matters was not sufficient
to carry them ... into the federal fold." Id.. A notable illustration of the Canadian re-
fusal to allow federal regulation of intraprovincial operations with substantial interpro-
vincial effects is The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434, 435-36 (Can.),
where the SCC invalidated a federal statute regulating grain elevators, despite the fact
that almost all grain stored in elevators is exported beyond provincial boundaries.
73 Citizen's Ins. Co. of Can. v. Parsons, [1881] 7 A.C. 96, 113 (U.K.P.C.).
74 The preclusion of federal regulation of a "particular trade in which Canadians would
otherwise be free to engage in the provinces" comes from Attorney-Generalfor Canada v. At-
torney-Generalfor Alberta, [1916] 1 A.C. 588, 596 (U.K.P.C.). In reasoning echoed by Chief
Justice Roberts in Sebelius, the narrowing of the broadly worded trade and commerce
power here illustrates the need to find limiting principles to broadly worded federal au-
thority. See Nat'I Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012).
75 City Nat'l Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 643.
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ties industry (akin to the powers delegated by Congress to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, which has been upheld in the United
States because all aspects of the registration, sale, and trading of se-
curities have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). In the Se-
curities Act Reference, the SCC acknowledged that some aspects of the
securities market are "national in scope and affect the country as a
whole."" The court emphasized that the existing doctrinal tests
"share a common theme-namely 'that the scheme of regulation
[must be] national in scope and that local regulation would be inad-
equate.' 7 8 The legislation must "invok[e] Parliament's unique ability
to effectively deal with economic issues in this category." 9
The SCC rejected the argument that comprehensive national reg-
ulation of securities was essential. The court acknowledged that
there might be a need for federal regulation to protect the economy
against "systemic risks" posed by a domino effect of default by one
market participant, and also that national data collection might be
essential to effective regulation of securities markets. However, the
Act's comprehensive scope also entailed detailed regulation of regis-
tration of corporations and brokers; these matters have been tradi-
tionally regulated by provinces, and the court found no reason why
the national economy depended on uniformity in that regard.80 Sig-
76 In upholding legislation granting the federal Securities and Exchange Commission broad
powers with regard to regulating business relating to securities, the U.S. Supreme Court
wrote,
This broad commerce clause does not operate so as to render the nation pow-
erless to defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or
destructive of the national economy. Rather it is an affirmative power commensu-
rate with the national needs. It is unrestricted by contrary state laws or private
contracts. And in using this great power, Congress is not bound by technical legal
conceptions. Commerce itself is an intensely practical matter. To deal with it ef-
fectively, Congress must be able to act in terms of economic and financial realities.
The commerce clause gives it authority so to act.
We need not attempt here to draw the outer limits of this plenary power. It is
sufficient to reiterate the well-settled principle that Congress may impose relevant
conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of interstate com-
merce in order that those channels will not become the means of promoting or
spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral or economic nature.
N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (citation omitted).
77 Reference re Sec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, 846 (Can.).
78 Id. at 874 (quoting City Nat'1 Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 678).
79 Id. at 875-76.
80 Id. at 888. The court had previously applied a flexible approach, reaffirming that prov-
inces retained jurisdiction over the investor-protection aspects of securities regulation,
while also allowing the federal government to regulate insider training of federally char-
tered corporations, and refusing to interpret the federal statute as preempting provincial
regulation. Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 (Can.). Here, the
court found that the proposed federal statute "overreaches the legislative interest of the
federal government" by going beyond genuine national goals "such as management of
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nificantly, the fact that Parliament conditioned the application of the
act in any province on each province's choice to opt in to the pro-
gram (ostensibly for political reasons) was evidence that national uni-
formity was not essential.'
The SCC distinguished the federal Competition Act (Canada's
equivalent of the United States's Sherman Antitrust Act), which it
had previously upheld under the trade and commerce power, reason-
ing that "[a]nti-competitive behaviour subjected to weak standards in
one province could distort the fairness of the entire Canadian mar-
ket" and the failure "by one province to legislate or the absence of a
uniform set of rules applicable throughout the country would render
the market vulnerable." 2  The court emphasized that legislation is
not constitutional simply because justices conclude "it may be the
best option from the point of view of policy." It suggested that Par-
liament's goals regarding securities regulation could be accommo-
dated by "co-operative federalism" with an agreed-upon package of
legislation to be adopted by federal and provincial legislatures. Fi-
nally, the recent decision would appear to significantly narrow, if not
foreclose, the hope for nationalists in language from City National
Leasing that the absence of any criterion was not necessarily determi-
native. Thus, for Parliament to exercise regulatory power over gen-
eral trade and commerce, it must persuade a majority of the justices
either that provinces lack jurisdiction to regulate (either individually
or cooperatively), or that national uniformity is essential. Clearly,
Parsons" lives; the fact that Parliament might perceive that a particu-
lar policy is important to implement throughout Canada and that
one or more provincial legislatures might not share this view is insuf-
ficient tojustify federal regulation.
systemic risk or Canada-wide data collection" to detailed regulation of all aspects of secu-
rities. Sec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. at 890.
81 Id. at 891; see Jean Leclair, "Please, Draw Me a Field ofjurisdiction": Regulating Securities, Se-
curing Federalism, 51 SUP. CT. L. RFv. (2d) 555, 573 (2010) (calling this political move
.constitutional harakiri").
82 Sec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. at 876-77. Although the support for the conclusion that prov-
inces are unable to enact competition laws has been strongly criticized, see, e.g., Noura
Karazivan & Jean-Francois Gaudreault-DesBiens, On Polyphony and Paradoxes in the Regula-
lion of Securities Within the Canadian Federation, 49 CAN. Bus. L.J. 1, 16-17 (2010), the more
recent decision belies the authors' prediction that the provincial inability test sets a "very
low" threshold for provincial inability. Id. at 22.
83 Sec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. at 878.
84 Id. at 867 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85 Gen. Motors of Can. Ltd. v. City Nat'l Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 662-63 (Can.).
86 Citizens Ins. Co. of Can. v. Parsons, [1881] 7 A.C. 96 (U.KP.C.).
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Other broadly worded grants of federal power in the BNA Act
have likewise been interpreted narrowly with a key focus on what
leading Canadian scholar Peter Hogg calls "provincial inability.",7
Most prominently, courts have narrowed the POGG power (section
91's preamble contains a broad grant of power to the federal gov-
ernment to legislate with regard to the "Peace, Order, and good Gov-
ernment of Canada")88 to three discrete situations. Parliament may
legislate even in areas of clear provincial authority during times of na-
tional emergency." Federal legislation is also appropriate with regard
to matters that do not seem to fall within any of the specific matters
listed for the federal Parliament or provincial legislatures in the BNA
Act. 0 Finally, the courts have over time created and expanded an au-
thority under the POGG power for Parliament to legislate with regard
to matters of "national concern." Although language in a variety of
opinions provide mixed messages about what constitutes "national
concern," Professor Hogg notes that the one coherent theme is the
inability of provinces to act, rather than the perceived desirability or
preference for a national solution.8 Thus, the SCC has upheld fed-
eral legislation regulating aeronautics," national capital regional
planning," marine pollution , and nuclear power.9' Justice Gerald Le
Dain expressly relied on the provincial inability test, which, in a way,
dates back to two older Privy Council decisions, one of which general-
ly suggested that "some matters, in their origin local and provincial,
might attain such dimensions as to effect the body politic of the Do-
minion, and to justify the Canadian Parliament in passing laws for
87 1 HOGG, supra note 37, § 17.3(b) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 91 (U.K) (emphasis omit-
ted).
89 1 HOGG, supra note 37, § 17.4. Examples cited include Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co. v.
Man. Free Press Co., [1923] A.C. 695 (U.K.P.C.) (upholding World War I price controls),
and, more controversially, Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (Can.) (up-
holding temporary controls to stop rampant inflation).
90 Examples include the power to enter into treaties with foreign nations (at confederation,
Canada was still part of the British Empire and did not enter into treaties on its own be-
half), regulation of offshore material beyond provincial jurisdiction, and the use of lan-
guages in dealings with the federal government. 1 HoGG, supra note 37, § 17.2. Because
section 92(11) only empowers provinces to legislate in regard to "The Incorporation of
Companies with Provincial Objects," the POGG power is the source of federal authority
to incorporate corporations. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section
92(11) (U.K.); Citizens Ins. Co. of Can. v. Parsons, [1881] 7 A.C. 96 (U.K.P.C.).
91 1 HOGG, supra note 37, § 17.3(b).
92 Johannesson v. Rural Municipality of W. St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292 (Can.).
93 Munro v. Nat'I Capital Comm'n, [1966] S.C.R. 663 (Can.).
94 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Can. Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.).
95 Ont. Hydro v. Ont. Labour Relations Bd., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 (Can.).
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their regulation," 6 and a more recent declaration that the POGG
power would include a matter that "goes beyond local or provincial
concern or interests and must, from its inherent nature, be a concern
of the Dominion as a whole." 7 This reflects classic "two-box" federal-
ism reasoning: the Privy Council noted that if the POGG power were
not "strictly confined" to "such matters as are unquestionably of Ca-
nadian interest and importance, . . . there is hardly a subject enumer-
ated in s. 92 upon which [the federal Parliament] might not legis-
late."98
The view that the federal legislature has authority to legislate
where the public policy objective can only be achieved through fed-
eral legislation is an essential one for any modern state. At the same
time, the requirement of a showing of provincial inability provides an
important limit on the scope of federal regulatory power, with signifi-
cant actual effects reflecting legislative policymaking. A prime illus-
tration is labor relations. The narrower scope of Parliament's trade
and commerce power, in contrast to the broader scope of Congress's
authority to regulate interstate commerce, means that the regulation
of management-labor relations is largely a matter of federal regula-
tion in the United States,99 whilst in Canada labor relations are largely
governed provincially.'o Although the rights of employers and work-
ers with regard to organization and collective bargaining obviously
have a national economic impact, the Canadian experience shows
that provinces providing greater protection for workers can co-exist
with neighbors providing more freedom for employers (although a
significant reality is that the spectrum of labor relations policies
among Canada's ten provinces is not that varied, and no province has
96 Attorney Gen. for Ont. v. Attorney Gen. for Can. (Local Prohibition Case), [1896] A.C. 348,
361 (U.K.P.C.).
97 Attorney Gen. for Ont. v. Can. Temperance Fed'n, [1946] A.C. 193, 193 (U.K.P.C.). As a
further practical limit on judicial expansion of the POGG power, the court has held that
if a matter qualifies as one of national concern, then provinces lack the power to legislate
in that area. Crown Zellerbach, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 433; cf Wabash, St. Louis. & Pac. Ry. v. Il-
linois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886) (providing that railroad rates for interstate shipments
were "of a general and national character, and cannot be safely and wisely remitted to lo-
cal rules and local regulations").
98 Local Prohibition Case, [1896] A.C. at 360-61. At the same time, much of the POGG pow-
ers relate to the sort of economic regulation generally assigned to Parliament, consistent
with Hector Langevin's view that these issues would tend to divide Canadians ideological-
ly rather than demographically.
99 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
100 Toronto Elec. Comm'rs v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 (U.K.P.C.). Snider was recently reaf-




openly tried to attract industry by deliberately and significantly slash-
ing worker protection laws).'0 '
Canadian jurisprudence offers a further limiting principle, appli-
cable to both federal and provincial legislation: courts review legisla-
tion that superficially appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the en-
acting legislative body to determine if the legislation's "pith and
substance" relates to the head of power under which authority is as-
serted. If, instead, the court finds the assertion of authority to be pre-
textual, the legislation will be found invalid.102
Two prominent cases illustrate this important principle. In the
Margarine Reference,'s the SCC invalidated a federal criminal statute
banning the manufacture of margarine. 4  Although precedents had
broadly construed Parliament's criminal law power,o'0 5 the court found
that matters in relation to criminal law ordinarily concerned public
peace, order, security, health, and morality. In contrast, the court
found that, in regard to the margarine ban, the "object ... is eco-
nomic and the legislative purpose, to give trade protection to the
dairy industry in the production and sale of butter."'00 To benefit one
group as against competitors was, in the court's view, "to deal directly
with the civil rights of individuals in relation to particular trade within
101 Applying the doctrinal tests set forth above would suggest the hypothetical possibility that
federal labor relations legislation could be justified under the trade and commerce test if
in fact one or more provinces so slashed worker protection that the other provinces were
forced to join a "race to the bottom." (However, when I posed this hypothetical to a lead-
ing Canadian constitutional law scholar, the fiction of provincial legislatures making this
policy choice was too great to allow him to supply an answer!) Earlier work implies that
even if provincial inability could be established with regard to labor relations, the topic
must remain under provincial control because labor relations is too broad a matter, and
has been subject to provincial regulation for too long, to permit federal control. See, e.g.,
W.R. Lederman, Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and Methods of Modera-
tion, 14 ALBERTA L. REv. 34, 46-47 (1976).
102 Canadian judges sometimes use the phrase "colourable" to describe pretextual legislation
whose pith and substance is not within the authority of the enacting legislative body, 1
HOGG, supra note 37, § 15.5(g), and polite judges are not always explicit in concluding
that claimed authority was pretext. The text is intended to include statutes that judges
find to primarily concern matters ultra vires the enacting legislative body, even if the legis-
lators intended in good faith to legislate within their powers.
103 Reference re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Indus. Act (Margarine Reference), [1949]
S.C.R. I (Can.).
104 Id. at 54, 68. Related provisions banning the importation or interprovincial sale of mar-
garine were upheld under the trade and commerce power.
105 Although the Quebecois eagerly sought British permission to use French law for civil mat-
ters, the application of English criminal law was less controversial. Because the Confed-
eration bargain sought to protect provincial autonomy primarily in areas where the Que-
becois strongly valued self-governance, criminal law has always been a federal question in
Canada.
106 Margarine Reference, [19491 S.C.R. at 50.
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the provinces."' 7 Thus, the legislation was properly characterized as a
matter of property and civil rights, rather than a matter of criminal
law. R. v. Morgentalere's involved a Nova Scotia statute making it an of-
fense to perform an abortion outside a hospital. Health care has long
been recognized as a provincial matter in Canada, based both on the
assignment of matters relating to the establishment, maintenance
and managements of hospitals,'o0 and regarding the regulation of a
particular industry that falls within property and civil rights."o Thus,
a health care regulation whose pith and substance related to econom-
ic or health and safety concerns would be within provincial jurisdic-
tion. To decide the case, the SCC reviewed the legislative history of
the statute and accompanying regulations, and found that the pur-
pose was neither economic nor related to health and safety (no one
challenged Morgentaler's claim that an abortion clinic was just as safe
and indeed a less expensive way to provide this health care service).
Rather, the court found that the purpose was to inhibit abortions be-
cause they were morally objectionable to a majority of provincial leg-
islators."' This purpose was the proper aim of the Criminal Law, and
thus the court held that abortions could only be regulated on moral
grounds by the federal Parliament.
To be clear, the Canadian doctrine is not an inquiry into the sub-
jective legislative motivation of the majority of members of Parlia-
ment or a provincial legislature. (Indeed, given party discipline, the
subjective motivation of most legislators on most issues is simply to
follow the party whip!) Rather, using a test somewhat less deferential
than the rational basis test often employed by American courts, Ca-
107 Id.
108 (Morgentaler Ill), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 (Can.). The case was the third and final decision by
the SCC resulting from the efforts of a renowned Montreal doctor, Henry Morgentaler,
to provide abortions to Canadian women. The first case, Morgentaler v. The Queen (Mor-
gentaler 1), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616 (Can.), upheld a provision of the Criminal Code banning
abortions unless approved by a hospital committee, against a federalism challenge that
the legislation was not within Parliament's criminal law power. (Two juries, however, re-
fused to convict him). The second case, Morgentaer v. I. (Morgentaler II), [1988] 1 S.C.R.
30 (Can.), struck down the same Criminal Code provisions as inconsistent with the 1982
Charter of Rights and Freedoms protection against infringements on the security of the
person except in accordance with principles of fundamental justices. Constitution Act,
1982, Section 7, beingSchedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
109 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 92(7) (U.K.).
110 Id. Section 92(13); cf Gen. Motors of Can. Ltd. v. City Nat'l Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641,
662 (Can.) (discussing the limits of the federal trade and commerce power in regulating
industries).
Ill Morgentaler III, [1993] 3 S.C.R. at 503 (examining the Hansard, equivalent of the Con-
gressional Record, to find significant opposition to abortion clinics per se and virtually lit-
tle concern with health or economic issues).
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nadian judges invoke this doctrine only when it is highly implausible,
if not totally irrational, for the legislature's purpose to have been one
within its assigned powers.'1 2 At the same time, this doctrine would
seem essential to judicial arbitration of the national-local distinction.
If Parliament could enact legislation dealing with matters falling on
the local side of the divide, under the pretext of asserting some fed-
eral power, the purposes for judicial policing of federalism would be
undermined.
In short, the "[p]reservation of a high degree of provincial auton-
omy has been a consistent theme of the federalism jurisprudence of
both the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Supreme
Court of Canada throughout [Canadian] history.""3 A review of the
Canadian experience with constitutional federalism reveals a con-
sistent need to protect French-Canadians, a minority in the country
but a majority in the Province of Quebec, with regard to their laws
governing private relations as well as religious and educational insti-
tutions. In so doing, Canadian courts have always used a "two-box"
approach to federalism, interpreting enumerated powers assigned to
the federal Parliament or provincial legislatures with regard to pre-
serving an appropriate balance. Although the Canadian Constitution
authorizes the federal Parliament to legislate in areas, enumerated or
not, where provinces are unable to act, the broad textual authority to
Parliament to regulate trade and commerce has been narrowly con-
strued to require a finding of provincial incompetence before federal
law can regulate activities taking place within provincial borders. Ca-
nadian courts not only limit each legislature to its assigned powers,
but inquire further into the pith and substance of legislation to en-
sure that a legislature is not using a pretextual argument to improp-
erly extend its jurisdiction. 1 4
112 Closely related is yet another useful interpretive method adopted by the SCC: the "dou-
ble aspect doctrine" that recognizes that both Parliament and provincial legislatures can
adopt valid laws with respect to a topic. A valid federal law would prevail in the event of
inconsistency, but for Parliament to enact legislation that supersedes (Americans would
say "preempts"), provincial law would require that the pith and substance of the preempt-
ing law fall within federal authority. Thus, the court rejected a claim that a federal bank-
ing law allowed federally chartered banks to sell insurance products within a province in a
manner contrary to provincial insurance law. Canadian W. Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
113 Robin Elliot, Safeguarding Provincial Autonomy from the Supreme Court's New Federal Para-
mountcy Doctrine: A Constructive Role for the Intention to Cover the Field Test, 38 SUP. CT. L.
REv. (2d) 629, 629-30 (2007).
114 The Canadian experience casts doubt on the conclusion that a "federal constitution ide-
ally gives the central and state governments the power to do what each does best," Cooter
& Siegel, supra note 36, at 118, at least if "best" is defined from an efficiency or economic
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III. NOTABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA
A key value of comparative insights lies in the identification of
significant differences in the contexts in which constitutional issues
arise in different countries. Such an analysis improves our ability to
identify how our nation's specific context shapes our constitutional
doctrine. This Part briefly discusses the significance of difference,
and then identifies important differences between Canadian and
American demography, current values, and national political pro-
cesses, all of which affect the way our respective supreme courts in-
terpret broadly worded constitutional texts regarding federalism.
A. The Significance ofDifference
The relevance of the Canadian experience for interpretation of
the United States Constitution depends, of course, on the interpre-
tive methodology being employed. None of the opinions in Sebelius
purport to decide the case primarily on grounds of plain textual
meaning or original intent. The opinions seem to reflect a shared
desire to adopt constitutional doctrines that are judicially managea-
ble tests to serve the federalism values that each Justice believes is
embedded in broadly worded text. Thus, the examination of demog-
raphy, current values, and political process is not offered for the pur-
pose of advocating that the United States import foreign norms that
individual Justices might find to be personally appealing."'
perspective. Cooter and Siegel's general proposition does not answer the constitutional
question why the central legislature cannot be trusted to devolve power where sub-
national governments can do it better, as is true in unitary systems and, to a large extent,
by state and provincial legislatures vis-a-vis local governments. More fundamentally, it
overlooks the specific historic and contemporary constitutional politics of nations that
may lead to arrangements where a sub-optimal allocation is preferred. For example, Ca-
nadians without major controversy accept the inefficiencies in a system where the private
law of contracts/obligations, property, and torts/delict are governed roughly by the Eng-
lish common law in nine provinces with seventy-five percent of the population but by a
French-style civil code in Quebec. Americans, conversely, may prefer a sub-optimal allo-
cation of power to the extent they believe that the national political process is less subject
to special interest capture and more likely to conduct reasoned deliberation than state
legislatures, see, e.g, James Madison, The Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr.
1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 356-57 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1975), and sufficiently protective of state interests to maintain a proper balance.
115 Some advocates of "American exceptionalism" thus reject a study of comparative law as an
aid to American judicial reasoning. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill":
American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1335 (2006). But even these advocates ought to recognize the value in using the
comparative method to identify precisely how the United States is exceptional; to find
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Rather, the Canadian experience is relevant to American constitu-
tional interpretation in several ways. First, comparing Canada and
the United States helps to identify salient aspects of precisely which
values are served by a constitutional federalism principle that pre-
vents a majority of the American people from imposing their will on a
minority of Americans who may comprise a majority in one or more
states. It is thus simply another tool to do whatjudges do, which is to
identify underlying principles and then articulate judicially managea-
ble standards. Second, Canadian legal doctrines, which have proved
workable in reflecting the values of Canadian federalism embraced by
the Supreme Court of Canada, provide useful comparators to evalu-
ate current American doctrines. They assist American judges in con-
sidering how current American doctrine serves core American consti-
tutional principles, and how their importation would reflect on
American federalism values.
B. Demographic Differences
The focus of this Article is on the judicial enforcement of constitu-
tional federalism: When should courts constrain a national political
majority from enacting policy preferences that are not shared by na-
tional political minorities who constitute a majority in one or more
states when the national majority believes that federal legislation is
appropriate? (This is to be distinguished from a federalism of efficient
decentralization, when the national government determines that local
autonomy is preferred. For example, even in strongly centralized
countries such as France, garbage collection is delegated to local gov-
ernments and not controlled by some Parisian bureaucrat in the Min-
istry of Waste.)116 One of the most salient arguments for strong juris-
dictional limits on the federal legislature, and one that may justify
policing by an independent judiciary, occurs where, injustice Sandra
Day O'Connor's words, the result is "a decentralized government that
will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous socie-
ty."" 7 This, indeed, is precisely the basis of Canadian federalism: the
Fathers of Confederation determined that a heterogenous society (at
origin, divided between predominantly Protestant Anglophones and
propriety in learning from the experience of others to the extent that, as to that particu-
lar factor, the United States is not exceptional; and to consider how particular aspects of
American exceptionalism can be best reflected in constitutional doctrine.
116 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 903, 910-11 (1994).
117 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (making a strong, clear statement in favor of
interpreting federal statutes to avoid intrusion into states' rights).
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French Catholics) will be best served by a decentralized government
where national minorities (the French) are regional majorities (in
Quebec)."" Today, differences in regional attitudes and interests
continue throughout Canada, extending beyond the original linguis-
tic-religious divide."'
Today, there remains a deep sense that the heterogeneous Cana-
dian society is well served by federalism. Of course, this sense re-
mains strong in Quebec, but also in other provinces as well. This is
because of another important feature of Canadian politics: many
Canadians perceive that their policy values are quite likely to be re-
flected in provincial governments, but despair that someone sharing
their views will be elected Prime Minister. Thus, social democrats
who support the New Democratic Party ("NDP") have historically
been able to win provincial elections (particularly in British Colum-
bia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, where pioneering social programs
such as medicare and legislation protecting human rights were first
enacted in North America') but until recently have despaired of se-
riously prevailing in national elections against the Liberals and Con-
servatives; likewise, various incarnations of right-wing parties have
long governed Alberta with a policy perspective unlikely to achieve
national success. As of this writing, for example, it is highly unlikely
that the premiers of Quebec (Parti Quebecois), Manitoba and Sas-
katchewan (NDP), or Alberta would consider it even a reasonable
possibility that someone who would implement their policy agenda
would form a government in Ottawa. As the SCC observed in its
landmark decision governing the terms by which Quebec might sepa-
rate from Canada, the ability of Canada's diverse citizenry to develop
"their societies" by preserving important areas of provincial autonomy
is a key aspect of Canadian constitutional federalism.'"' Another key
demographic difference lies in the extent to which a single Canadian
118 SILVER, supra note 50, at 34 ("[P]rovincial autonomy was to be sought in the proposed
constitution as a key safeguard of the interests of French Canada.").
119 See Watts, supra note 49, at 32 (citing widespread differences in the economic bases of
provinces, extensive trade with the United States resulting in more "north-south links"
than "east-west ties," and different patterns of immigrant settlement giving Atlantic prov-
inces, Quebec, Ontario, the prairie provinces, and British Columbia each a "distinctive
cast").
120 See JEREMY WEBBER, REIMAGINING CANADA: LANGUAGE, CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND THE
CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 360 n.26 (1994) (citing Andrew Petter, Federalism and the Myth
of the Federal Spending Power, 68 CANADIAN B. REv. 448 (1989)).
121 Reference reSecession ofQue., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 251 (Can.).
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province-Ontario-is perceived to dominate national politics in
ways that no American state can.
With regard to the United States, however, national minorities
are, in general, regional minorities as well. Most notably, with regard
to racial issues, Justice O'Connor's federalist paean is demonstrably
false; state governments (particularly in the South) have in no sense
been more sensitive to the needs of their heterogenous citizenry.
Thus, the Supreme Court unreservedly upheld the national power to
impose a monolithic solution to issues of racial discrimination in em-
ployment, public accommodations, housing, and public education.
Indeed, Jesse Choper correctly observes that the one area of public
policy where regional majorities historically existed concerned eco-
nomics (policies assisting manufacturing versus agriculture, free
trade versus protection, financial industries and those victimized by
their practices), and this is the "very subject over which the central
government has probably the least disputed authority."2 3
Although modern day America reflects deep demographic differ-
ences that might support constitutional politics favoring decentral-
124ized authority over key social, moral, and cultural issues, a major
difference in constitutional politics is the absence of despair that
each side's views can prevail nationally. Because of the strong two-
party system and a primary election system that often favors ideologi-
cal activists, "deep blue" Democrats favored by New Yorkers and Cali-
fornians can and do elect their favored national candidates (e.g.,
Barack Obama), and the same is true with "deep red" Texans (e.g.,
George W. Bush). It is likely that most, if not all, of the fifty state
governors would, in contrast to their Canadian provincial counter-
parts, have a reasonable hope that someone of their political ideology
could win the 2016 presidential election. Thus, unlike Quebecois,
Albertans, Manitobans, and British Columbians, Californians and
Texans continue to aspire to preferred national solutions, rather than
tolerate disagreeable policies in other states that have some potential
to indirectly affect their own welfare.
122 Cf Jean Leclair, Forging a True Federal Spirit: Refuting the Myth of Quebec's "Radical Differ-
ence," in RECONQUERING CANADA: QUEBEc FEDERALISTS SPEAK UP FOR CHANGE 29, 66
(Andre Pratte ed., 2008) (stating that specific interests of citizens of Prince Edward Is-
land, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland are unlikely to be voiced were Canada a unitary
state, and, contrary to what some Quebecois believe, "all Anglo-Canadians do not desper-
ately aspire to become Ontarians").
123 CHOPER, supra note 27, at 192.
124 See Grant S. Nelson & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues,
85 IowA L. REv. 1, 115-16 (1999).
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C. The National Political Process
In interpreting all broadly worded constitutional texts, judges
must necessarily decide how closely to scrutinize legislative judg-
ments, and judicial doctrine creation must necessarily reflect a judg-
ment about the ability of the political process to adequately protect
the people's interests. This is explicitly reflected in American consti-
tutional history, as the United States Supreme Court recoiled from
the "Lochner era" of close scrutiny of legislation interfering with eco-
nomic liberty by explicitly tying close scrutiny to its view of the effica-
cy of ordinary politics. Thus, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,'"2
the Court established that it would not invalidate regulatory legisla-
tion affecting ordinary commercial transactions under the broadly
worded Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some ra-
tional basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators,"I26
but suggested that this approach would not apply to "legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or where
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those po-
litical processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."'
The same jurisprudential considerations apply to the need for
courts to actively review legislation to preserve federalism. Canada's
political process suggests that close judicial policing of what is na-
tional and what is local is necessary to preserve a balance reflecting
Canadian values. The original understanding of the Canadian con-
federation was that ordinary national politics would not be sufficient
to protect interests of French Canadians who correctly perceived that
they would always constitute a national minority, a regional majority,
and that they would have distinctive interests with regard to a variety
of issues; thus, the BNA Act lists sixteen matters within the exclusive
jurisdiction of provincial legislatures with the understanding that at-
tempts by Ottawa to encroach on provincial jurisdiction would be
subject to judicial review, ultimately independent review, by the Privy
Council in London.'
125 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
126 Id. at 152.
127 Id. at 152-53 n.4.
128 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 92 (U.K).
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Perhaps the major institutional difference between the United
States and Canada is the American entrenchment of the notion of
separated legislative and executive power, while Canada adopted the
British model that effectively melds political power: party discipline
allows the Prime Minister to control the activities of the legislature,
and the principle of responsible government continues to vest signifi-
cant formal power in the Crown, while simultaneously requiring that
this power be only exercised on advice of the Prime Minister." The
Canadian Senate is not equal, legitimate, or effective in significantly
constraining the House of Commons. It consists of political "wor-
thies" appointed by the Prime Minister to serve until they reach the
age of seventy-five, and an unwritten convention (that the Senate oc-
casionally breaches) is that the Senate will not defeat legislation
passed by the elected House of Commons (and even when it does, it
gives way if the government is re-elected). 3o
Another huge difference is that Canada's House of Commons fea-
tures strict party discipline on any measure the Prime Minister choos-
es to deem as a vote of confidence, precluding dissent by those whose
regions may not support the federal cabinet on this particular policy
issue.' There is no room for the "British Columbia delegation" to
act independently, or for lobbying groups representing provincial or
local governments to be able to influence individual members of the
majority party (except in internal debates as interlocutors trying to
persuade the Prime Minister). There is no Electoral College: the
Prime Minister is the leader of the party with the most seats in the
House of Commons, a contest fought riding by riding,1 ' and the pro-
vincial vote is wholly irrelevant. Nor are there legislative procedures
to allow a minority of the House of Commons to significantly inhibit
the federal government's determination to pass a statute that might
129 The significance of this distinction is highlighted in Watts, supra note 49, at 29-30.
130 ANDREW HEARD, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE MARRIAGE OF LAW AND
POLITIcS 87-98 (1991). Recent analysis by Wade Wright concurs that the Senate is not
likely to be an effective protector of provincial autonomy. Wade Wright, The Political
Safeguards of Canadian Federalism 55 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
131 HEARD, supra note 130, at 79-82; see also Jean Leclair, The Securities Reference The Ghost
of Political Representation Comes Knocking at Federalism's Door 5 (Oct. 13, 2012) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2189661 ("[R]esponsible government has contributed to Parliament's incapacity to give
voice to regional demands and aspirations and, in so doing, has buttressed the claim of
provincial governments of their being sole interpreters of their province's wishes and de-
sires.").
132 'Riding' is the term used by Canadians for the geographic districts in which they elect
members of the House of Commons; it is the equivalent to what Americans call a 'con-
gressional district.'
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be inconsistent with federalism principles; a majority of the House of
Commons (under the whip of party discipline) can cut off debate,
and committee chairmen are equally subject to party discipline. To
be sure, a variety of intergovernmental settings provide provincial
premiers and others with opportunities to facilitate political opposi-
tion to federal initiatives, '" and in some cases this political pressure
will resonate sufficiently with votes to force the federal government to
alter its course.'" But none of these seriously preclude the ability of
national majorities to impose their will on national minorities that
happen to be regional majorities. In short, it was the division of
powers itself, rather than the structure of the national government,
133 These are catalogued in Wright, supra note 130. One noted forum of provincial opposi-
tion is the First Ministers Meetings. Although frequent in earlier times, the government
of Prime Minister Stephen Harper has sharply curtailed them, apparently to prevent the
sort of discord that would allow premiers to more effectively oppose federal initiatives.
Lawrence Martin, Can the Influx of Women Change Canadian Politics?, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb.
12, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/can-the-influx-of-women-
change-canadian-politics/article8466800/.
As detailed by Wright, supra note 130, at 102-03, provincial governments may pursue
a strategy of testing the limits of federal legislative jurisdiction in court, but when unsuc-
cessful develop cooperative approaches that limit the scope of actual federal intervention.
To the extent that federal jurisdiction is based on concerns about the ability to accom-
plish policies in the face of a wide variation in provincial responses to a common prob-
lem, intergovernmental arrangements may assuage concerns about provincial inability,
resulting in a mutually acceptable agreement whereby provinces continue to exercise
primary jurisdiction while the federal government is assured that sufficient uniformity re-
sults in the protection of national interests. (A similar example, from the United States,
is that current doctrine would clearly allow Congress to enact a national commercial
code, but Congress does not exercise this power because of the success of the Uniform
Commercial Code adopted with minimal variation by almost all the states.) This inquiry,
however, is not really the focus of this Article.
134 It may be true that provincial opposition and political pressure led the federal govern-
ment to concede that provinces retained primary jurisdiction over labor market training
and that new programs would not be launched without a province's express agreement.
Id. at 93-99. However, other than restating the political fact that opposition officials can
constrain the federal government through political pressure, it is difficult to see how this
supports Wright's claim that intergovernmental safeguards operate to significantly con-
strain federal overreaching. Rather, other than safeguards facilitating pure politics, this
seems to be a retreat from the federal government's original position that only a national
program could effectively identify where workers needed to be trained and to foster mo-
bility in the Canadian labor market. Id. at 94. Not even the most fervent "federal imperi-
alists" claim that provincial political opposition is never effective in restraining federal ini-
tiatives; moreover, fully consistent with the federalism doctrines established by the
Supreme Court of Canada, the case study could also reveal an initial federal perception
that provinces were unable to effectively solve job training problems, but that further dia-
logue with provincial governments resulted in a federal recognition that non-uniform
approaches would not hinder the success of the federal goals.
135 See Wright, supra note 130, at 111 (stating that intergovernmental safeguards of federal-
ism are neither ideal, "[n]or even adequate, safeguards of provincial jurisdiction").
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which was necessary to ensure that groups (most notably, but not ex-
clusively, Quebecois) could ensure that their essential interests could
be protected from interference by a national majority.'
A foundational prong of the argument against the United States
Supreme Court's active arbitration of federalism disputes is that the
national political process adequately protects the constitutional struc-
ture and federalism norms designed by the Framers and valued
throughout American history. In his book, Judicial Review and the Na-
tional Political Process, Jesse Choper argued that a number of features
of the American political process justify the "[d]ispensability of
[j]udicial [r]eview."' 7 These include an equal and effective Senate to
protect states' rights, a House of Representatives where representa-
tives of both political parties often coordinate behavior on matters di-
rectly affecting their states, the effect of the Electoral College on
presidential campaigns because of the need to campaign for state ma-
jorities rather than simply a national majority, the natural progres-
sion of many Senators and Representatives from positions in state
and local government, and the effectiveness of lobbying organiza-
tions representing governors, state governments, mayors, cities, and
counties.18  Other aspects of the national legislative process inhibit
federal efforts to enact legislation objectionable to state and local
leaders as encroaching on their prerogatives, including the ability of
forty-one senators to filibuster, and the committee system that per-
mits senior legislators to block or significantly inhibit passage of legis-
lation that might well find support among a legislative majority. 39
Choper's analysis of the current process confirms what historians be-
lieve was the Framers' prediction: delegates representing diverse
state interests can now reach agreements empowering the national
government to address "national ills that none of them denied" once
the structure was established to allow each to "counter threats to its
136 In contrast, one Madison scholar concluded that the American Framers' objective was to
create a central government capable of legislating not only where states were incompe-
tent to act but also where minorities within a state had to be protected from violations of
their rights. LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 166-7 (1995). A more recent Canadian version of
this dispute was a key fault line of disagreement between Canadian Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau, who believed that a judicially enforced national charter was the best means to
protect local minorities, and the separatist Quebec Premier Rend Levesque, who believed
that political accommodations among provincial premiers would best protect individual
rights. See John Trent, Common Ground and Disputed Territory, in MUST CANADA FAIL? 139,
139-51 (Richard Simeon ed., 1977).
137 Choper, supra note 27, at 171 (emphasis omitted).
138 Id. at 176-81.
139 Id. at 185.
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essential interests."o40  In addition, Professor Larry Kramer has noted
the "unique American system of decentralized national political par-
ties, which linked the fortunes of federal officeholders to state politi-
cians and parties and in this way assured respect for state sovereign-
ty."' "[B]y linking the fortunes of officeholders at different levels,"
Kramer concludes that American political parties "fostered a mutual
dependency that induced federal lawmakers to defer to the desires of
state officials and state parties.",4 2
As noted above, virtually none of these features are present in
Canada to protect provincial governments from undue encroach-
ments from Ottawa. 43
D. The Political Values of Federalism: Strategy and Tactics'"
The salient aspects of Canadian demography and constitutional
structure discussed above lead to a consistent political preference for
a federal structure that ensures that many issues are resolved differ-
ently by regional majorities; Canadians strategically prefer to forego
140 BANNING, supra note 136, at 157. It is not my purpose to independently demonstrate that
Choper's thesis is correct; it certainly has its academic critics. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker &
Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75
(2001); Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995,45 KAN. L. REV. 1113 (1997); Saikishna B. Prakash &John C.
Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001);
William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985).
141 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 276 (2000).
142 Id. at 278; see also BANNING, supra note 136, at 162-63 (quoting Madison's view that even
if, hypothetically, indefinite power were given to the national legislature, these represent-
atives would be politically constrained from taking unwarranted power from state gov-
ernments).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 129-36. Some important new work by Wade Wright
suggests a "middle ground," acknowledging that the Canadian national political process
is insufficient to protect provincial interests but that cooperative federalism resulting
from informal negotiation between federal and provincial officials serves both as a check
and a desirable goal thatjudicial review can facilitate. Wright, supra note 130.
144 In this Article, these terms are used in the sense borrowed from industrial organization
economics and antitrust law. Business tactics (also often called "best practices") are de-
signed to maximize short-term profits; strategic behavior involves the deliberate sacrifice
of short-term advantage or profits in order to recoup even larger profits in the medium-
or long-term. The classic example of strategic behavior is predatory pricing by a domi-
nant firm, using superior access to capital to lower prices to levels that their rivals cannot
sustain, driving them out of business and then raising prices later. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton
et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000). But stra-
tegic behavior may not be unlawful or contrary to the public interest. See, e.g., In re E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (discussing a dominant firm that kept
prices high, sacrificing short-term profits, in order to raise cash to invest in new efficient
plants and thereby gain a long-term advantage over antiquated rivals).
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the opportunity to permit the views of a majority of Canadians to pre-
vail throughout the country. In contrast, the history of American
constitutional politics is littered with examples of a tactical view of
federalism: Americans typically believe that the level of government
most appropriate to resolve any particular issue is the level of gov-
ernment most likely to produce desired substantive results. The fidel-
ity of Canadian history to federalism as a strategic principle provides
further support for the SCC's continued role as a judicial arbiter. In
contrast, the pervasive tactical use of federalism in American history
undercuts the arguments for the U.S. Supreme Court serving a simi-
lar role. A leading example from Canadian history, and a thought
experiment as to how similar issues would be resolved south of the
border, illuminates this point.
One of the most important events in Canadian history was the
controversy surrounding the Manitoba Schools Act, originally passed
in 1890.'14 One of the pivotal bargains of confederation concerned
the constitutional entrenchment of "any right or privilege with re-
spect to denominational schools which any class of persons have by
law in the province at the union[ .]"146 At the time of confederation,
the law of the Province of Canada (now Ontario and Quebec) pro-
vided public funding for English Protestant schools and for French
Catholic schools. section 93 of the BNA Act-which generally dele-
gates educational legislation exclusively to the provinces-provides
both a justiciable constraint on the ability of Ontario or Quebec to
scale back on the rights of their religious minorities (Catholics in On-
tario and Protestants in Quebec), as well as an express authorization
for the federal Parliament to override provincial legislation that prej-
145 Public Schools Act, 1890, 53 Vict., c. 38 (Man.).
146 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 93(1) (U.K.). The absence of
a constitutional ban on established religion, as well as this specific constitutional guaran-
tee, obviously makes this specific Canadian experience much different than that which
exists in the United States, where public funding for parochial schools is strictly limited
by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (barring
a taxpayer subsidy for teachers of secular subjects in private religious schools). Indeed,
the SCC has expressly rejected a challenge to the Ontario legislature's policy of continu-
ing to fund Catholic and Protestant schools, but not Jewish or Muslim schools, despite the
Charter of Rights provision, Constitution Act, 1982, Section 15, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K), protecting against discrimination on the basis of religion.
Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (Can.) (dismissing plaintiffs' appeal seeking relief
based on non-funding of religious schools attended by their children). Subsequently,
Parliament added a new section 93A, repealing its provisions as to Quebec. Constitution
Amendment, 1997 (Que.), S.I./97-141, C.Gaz. 1997.II.1. Note that Anglophone Que-
beckers' rights to have their children educated in English is entrenched in the Charter,
Constitution Act, 1982, Section 23, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.).
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udicially affects these entrenched rights."' When Manitoba was ad-
mitted to the Union in 1872, the Manitoba Act expanded on these
rights, providing that the new province's legislature could not enact
legislation that prejudicially affected denominational rights or privi-
141leges enjoyed by "[1]aw or practice" prior to union.
This became a divisive issue of constitutional law and politics two
decades later, when Manitoba's demographics shifted from approxi-
mately sixty-forty English-French to a population where Anglophones
exceeded eighty percent.4  Manitoba's legislature halted public
funding for denominational schools, instead providing for a single
system of public schools, where instruction would be in English (and
where prayers would follow the Protestant rituals). The SCC held
that the Manitoba Schools Act violated the denominational rights of
Franco-Manitoban Catholics guaranteed in Section 22 of the Manito-
ba Act.50 But the Privy Council reversed, reasoning that Catholics
were not "prejudicially affected" because they were still free to send
their children to English-language schools and it was their own reli-
gious views that led them to be "unable to partake of the advantages
which the law offers to all alike."'" So the Franco-Manitobans turned
to the Canadian Parliament, and the Conservative Prime Minister, Sir
Charles Tupper, introduced legislation to overturn the Manitoba
statute. However, the legislation was blocked by the Liberal leader of
the opposition, Wilfred Laurier. Laurier maintained his unwilling-
147 Brophy v. Attorney-Gen. of Man., [1895] A.C. 202 (U.K.P.C.) ("Roman Catholics having
acquired by such legislation the right to control and manage their denominational
schools, to have them maintained out of the general taxation of the province, to select
books for their use, and to determine the character of the religious teaching therein,
were affected as regards that right by the Acts of 1980, under which State aid was with-
drawn from their schools, while they themselves remained liable to local assessment in
support of non-sectarian schools to which they conscientiously objected."); City of Winni-
peg v. Barrett, [1892] A.C. 445 (U.K.P.C.) (holding that the Act of 1890, which abolished
the denominational system of public education, did not violate the Act of 1870 authoriz-
ing the provincial legislature exclusively to make laws in relation to education).
148 Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict., c. 3, section 22 (Can.).
149 This demographic shift was a huge disappointment to Canadian Framer Georges Cartier,
who had negotiated with Francophone M6tis rebels and crafted the Manitoba Act to cre-
ate a bilingual province, like Quebec, that would attract surplus Quebecois farmers away
from migration to New England. See Michael D. Behiels, Contated Ground: The State and
Language Rights in Canada, 1760-2000, 39 Sup. CT. L. REV. (2d) 23, 38-39 (2008). In the
event, over 400,000 French Canadians moved to the United States in search of factory
work between 1870 and 1900. Id. at 40.
150 Barrett v. City ofWinnipeg, [1891] 19 S.C.R. 374 (Can.).
151 Barrett, [1892] A.C. at 458.
924 [Vol. 16:4
INSIGHTS FROM CANADA
ness to support federal override legislation upon his election as Can-
ada's first French-Canadian and Catholic Prime Minister.5 2
Laurier was so committed to avoiding undermining the principle
of provincial autonomy that he was prepared to accept Manitoba leg-
islation that ended French-Canadian dreams of a bilingual and bicul-
tural western Canada.13  His federalism was strategic. For Laurier,
the threat of improper intervention into the autonomy of the prov-
ince of Quebec, by a Parliament where French Canadians would al-
ways be a minority, was real. Another provision of the BNA Act gave
the federal government a general power to disallow any provincial
law.'54 Laurier asserted that this power (unused since 1943'") should
only be used to bar a provincial law that was unconstitutional or that
directly contradicted the national interest.' Quebecois parliamen-
tarians had previously won a hard-fought battle to persuade Con-
servative Prime Minister John A. MacDonald not to use the disallow-
ance power to overturn a Quebec statute settling the expropriation of
Jesuit estates that included a provision permitting the Pope to ap-
prove the allocation of funds among Catholic Church entities. 57
The need to adopt a strategic federalism had been already appar-
ent to Laurier when serving as the Liberal opposition leader to Prime
Minister MacDonald. Explaining to an old friend, a leading journal-
ist from his hometown, why he had acquiesced in legislation for the
Northwest Territories that did not require bilingual government, he
wrote,
152 The story is retold in JOSEPH SCHULL, LAURIER: THE FIRST CANADIAN, 302-16, 328-35
(1966).
153 Behiels, supra note 149, at 43. In later years, by then a long-standing Prime Minister, Lau-
rier refused to impose bilingualism on the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan,
believing that provincial majorities must determine cultural rights. SILVER, supra note 50,
at 194.
154 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, Section 90 (U.K.).
155 Many leading scholars view future use as improper: if the provincial legislation is objec-
tionable on legal grounds the remedy is judicial challenge; if the legislation is objectiona-
ble as unwise, the Canadian view is that this is a question for provincial voters. 1 HOGG,
supra note 37, § 5.3(e). The SCC has recognized that the power has fallen into "disuse,"
The Queen v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, 72 (Can.), and its exercise today would be
considered contrary to an unwritten constitutional convention. PIERRE EliloTTRUDEAU,
FEDERALISM AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS 149 (1968).
156 1 House of Commons Debates, 7th Parliament, 6th Sess. (Mar. 3,1896), at 2741-42. In
these parliamentary remarks, Laurier is perhaps a bit disingenuous in conflating the fed-
eral government's use of the general disallowance power contained in Section 90 with the
very specific power to override provincial abuse of denominational rights in section 93,
but significantly Laurier seemed to view both as improper intervention into provincial au-
tonomy.
157 SCHULL, supra note 152, at 225-27.
Apr. 2014] 925
SJOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
There was no other solution for this question. I wish you would point out
the necessity for the people of Quebec province to maintain inviolate the
principle of local autonomy. There are circumstances when it may tell
against us, but it is the only protection that we have under the constitu-
tion, and if we want to apply it in our own behalf we must be careful to
apply it also when it is contrary to us[.] 151
This landmark event in constitutional politics illustrates how Ca-
nadian constitutional values follow from the demographic and struc-
tural differences identified above. Many Canadians perceive of them-
selves as being in a permanent minority in national politics
(Quebecois, western social democrats, prairie pro-energy/pro-
development conservatives), but with a strong probability of having
their views of public policy reflected in legislation passed by their
provincial government. Absent judicially policed federalism, these
Canadians would not be able to stop national majorities from impos-
ing their will on them. Thus, the notion of strategic federalism re-
mains vibrant in Canada today. 15
In contrast, Americans who despair of being part of a winning na-
tional coalition are, generally speaking, also unlikely to see them-
selves as winning locally. Both Americans who form the "progressive
base" of the Democratic Party or the "conservative base" of the Re-
publican Party, as well as political moderates, perceive that their aspi-
rations to govern in Washington are realistic. Thus, a states' rights
perspective animated many conservative Republicans during the
Washington ascendancy of liberal Democrats beginning with Roose-
velt, but changed course when the Reagan and Bush Administrations
could implement politically popular conservative policies on a na-
158 Id. at 241 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159 This is not to suggest that all federal politicians channel Wilfred Laurier. However, it is
noteworthy that in Wright, supra note 130, the author's comprehensive review of motiva-
tions for federal encroachment on provincial prerogatives cites only the American expe-
rience, and no Canadian examples, to support the claim that federal officials overreach
even if they believed "that certain issues should generally be pursued at the provincial
level, and that their desire to get their way on some public policy issue may trump, be-
cause they have more control at the federal level." Id. at 43. As to the suggestion that
federalism issues are too abstract to attract voters' attention as an explanation for the
purely tactical use of states' rights arguments in the United States, see John 0. McGinnis &
Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of judicial Review in a Federal System, 99
Nw. U. L. REv. 89 (2004), there is no suggestion that Canadian voters are somehow supe-
rior at comprehending "abstract" concepts. The more persuasive explanation of Ameri-
can federalism values is the ongoing preference of politically motivated American voters
to have their substantive policy preferences enacted by whichever level of government will
enact them. Cf Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 131,
132 (2004) ("[I]nterest groups, voters, and elected officials care more about underlying
policy issues than about structural protections . . . .").
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tional basis.'" Partisans of divisive causes typically retain continued
optimism that their side will prevail nationally (a strategic approach
facilitated by the ability of strong partisans to prevail in each major
party's primary election season). Consider moral questions that
Americans today tend to call "social issues." In most cases, national
uniformity is not required, but is a national solution desirable?""
Doctrinally, in the United States, the answer is that Congress may
enact legislation to pursue moral or social objectives if the legislation
relates to economic activity that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.'6 Politically, the answer seems to clearly be tactical. To
illustrate, today most observers perceive that a majority of Congress
would be unlikely to adopt strict rules limiting the availability of safe
abortions to women who want them, and a majority of Congress
would also be unlikely to grant official recognition to marriages be-
tween same-sex couples. Thus, social liberals are tactical federalists
who oppose delegating the abortion issue to the states, while prefer-
ring that Congress allow and facilitate states who so choose to permit
same-sex marriage;'" at the same time, social conservatives favor de-
160 See Devins, supra note 149, at 135-36; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemp-
lion, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1441, 1483 (2008) (noting that the George W. Bush Admin-
istration's Food and Drug Administration alone sought to preempt more state regulations
than the Clinton Administration); see also Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (upholding the Reagan Administration's regulation preempting lib-
eral, pro-consumer California law with an unusually divided Court).
161 For historic reasons, under the Canadian Constitution many of these social issues are in-
deed to be determined nationally, because the BNA Act authorizes the federal Parliament
to enact legislation relating to "Marriage and Divorce" and the "Criminal Law." British
North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, Sections 91(26)-(27) (U.K.). The principal
"Father of Confederation," SirJohn A. MacDonald, strongly believed that a defect in the
American system was the disparate treatment for criminal offenses in different states.
Mark Carter, Recognizing Original (Non-Delegated) Provincial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Criminal
Offences, 38 OTIAWA L. REv. 163, 171 n.24 (2007). The central government's authority to
impose criminal law derives from the original policy of the Quebec Act of 1774 to allow
the occupants of the conquered New France to preserve French civil law but to accept
English criminal law. J. Ll. J. Edwards, The Advent of English (Not French) C'iminal Law and
Procedure into Canada-A Close Call in 1774, 26 CRIM. L.Q. 464 (1984). The centralizing ef-
fect is significantly modified by the assignment of provinces of authority to enforce the
criminal law, see British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 92(14)
(U.K.); Carter, supra note 160. The Canadian Framers also sought uniform marriage
rules to prevent problems that had arisen in the United States with regard to marriages or
divorces recognized in one state but not another. See I HOGG, supra note 37, at § 27.3.
162 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawing racial dis-
crimination by restaurants and hotels); infra note 189 and accompanying text.
163 Obviously, I put to the side the constitutional argument advanced by social liberals that
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples unconstitutionally deprives gay men and lesbi-
ans of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
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centralizing abortion policy, while favoring federal legislation that re-
fuses federal recognition of state-blessed same-sex marriages and ex-
cepts from the normal practice a state's recognition of lawful mar-
riages from another state.0  How many Americans'6  would be
confident that Congress and the President would enact their current
policy preferences, but would oppose such legislation on the ground
that the national minority ought to be able to have their own oppos-
ing preferences reflected in the laws of their state, channeling
Wilfred Laurier's observation that there "are circumstances when it
may tell against us, but it is the only protection that we have under
the constitution, and if we want to apply it in our own behalf we must
be careful to apply it also when it is contrary to us"?m
Tactical federalism is so widespread and historically ingrained in
the United States that the proposition that federal officials, or the
voters that elect them, might find that good policy or good politics
calls for federal abstention seems to violate common sense:
First, all national lawmakers wish to effect change in various policies,
both because they believe change serves what they view as the best inter-
est of the country and because their reelection is helped when they can
tell voters they passed laws that voters favor. Thus, even if some lawmak-
ers believe that certain policies are better adopted and implemented on
the state level, they may nonetheless resort to federal lawmaking as a se-
cond-best alternative over which they have more influence. In that way,
they ensure the reform happens-and they claim credit for it. To put it
another way, people seldom seek national office, enduring the difficulties
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013).
164 Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). Key provisions of this act were struck
down as violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment in United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
165 1 exclude from this category of more than 300 million Americans the discrete category of
professors of constitutional law. See, e.g., Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 123, at 12 ("[O]nly
states can respond effectively to local concerns on noncommercial subjects like family law
and violent crime, which reflect deeply held ideological and cultural norms."). From the
perspective of political strategy, one of the inherent checks on federal power encroaching
onto states' rights is the need for federal officials to persuade a majority of Congress to
enact legislation that (a) reflects sound public policy and (b) is an appropriate subject for
national legislation. In contrast, opponents can prevail with a coalition of those who op-
pose the proposed legislation on its merits and those who agree that the legislation is de-
sirable but believe that the matter should be left to the states. However, in order to stake
out the latter position, a successful candidate would have to have a credible reputation
for preserving states' rights regardless of the merits of the policy, something virtually no
major candidate for national office has recently tried.
166 SCHULL, supra note 152, at 241 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of the modern campaign, only to argue that other political actors ought
to be making key decisions while they sit back and watch. 6 7
Canada's history teaches, however, that this approach is not inherent
in democratic politics but specifically contextual to the American
demographic and historical experience.
Wilfred Laurier's constitutional politics led him to prefer provin-
cial autonomy, even at the expense of a French-Canadian vision of a
bilingual nation, because he recognized that Francophones will al-
ways be a national minority and a regional majority. In contrast, the
American credited for designing our constitutional federalism, James
Madison, often displayed a tactical approach, alternating between a
desire for a strengthened national government and states' rights
based on contemporary political circumstances. Prior to the Consti-
tutional Convention, Madison drew upon his unhappy experience in
the special-interest-driven Virginia legislature and his somewhat hap-
pier experience in the Articles of Confederation Congress to favor a
"royal veto" of state laws by the new national legislature, who would
be comprised of a better class of legislator and less likely to be subject
to factional takeover.'" This power would allow national majorities to
override national minorities comprising state majorities, not only to
prevent states from thwarting legitimate federal power, but also to
prevent states from "thwarting and molesting each other" and "even
from oppressing the minority within themselves.",6 Anotherjustifica-
tion for a congressional veto of state legislation was the "imprecise
and hence arbitrary basis of the nominal distinctions between" state
and federal power.7 1
As a Representative from Virginia in the Second Congress, Madi-
son moved into political opposition from the ascendant views of
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, opposing legislation to cre-
ate a Bank of the United States. A principal argument Madison em-
ployed was that the Constitution did not grant Congress the power to
incorporate private business associations. Specifically, Madison
167 Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1495, 1513
(2008).
168 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 51-52 (1996).
169 BANNING, supra note 136, at 117 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jeffer-
son (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 114, at 318) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This proposal was rejected by the convention, and even Jeffer-
son opposed it as an overly broad encroachment on state powers, because in the latter's
view only one percent of state laws would affect the nation as a whole. Banning, supra
note 136, at 118.
170 RAKOVE, supra note 168, at 52-53.
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voiced concern that such a broad reading of the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause would give Congress unlimited power.''
Returning to power as President Thomas Jefferson's Secretary of
State, Madison assuaged Jefferson's concerns that the Constitution
did not authorize the government to execute the Louisiana Purchase,
by arguing that the government's power to make treaties provided a
constitutional basis.' During the final two years ofJefferson's presi-
dency, Madison included in his program to build the post-war econ-
omy his support for the creation of the Second Bank of the United
States.17
Perhaps the best known American example of the tactical use of
constitutional politics to preserve state autonomy was the resistance
of southern states to the Civil Rights movement. A notable and then-
controversial act was President Dwight D. Eisenhower's dispatch of
federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce the constitutional
rights of African American schoolchildren to attend desegregated
schools.' 4  Yet just over a century earlier, the roles were reversed;
faced with popular and official resistance in northern states to the re-
turn of fugitive slaves-a "right" guaranteed to slave-holders in the
Constitution'-Congress provided that federal marshals would be
employed to capture and return escaped slaves." Presidents Millard
Fillmore and Franklin Pierce had to order federal troops to enforce
the constitutional rights of slave owners.' And just as the United
171 JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 114 (3d
ed. 2007).
172 Id. at 164. This view was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding an environmental protection statute passed by Congress pri-
or to expansion of federal legislative authority under the Commerce Clause as nonethe-
less valid to implement a treaty with Great Britain); cf Attorney-Gen. for Can. v. Attorney-
Gen. for Ont., [1937] A.C. 326 (U.KP.C.) (invalidating a statute passed by the Parliament
of Canada concerning labor relations-a matter generally under provincial jurisdiction-
despite enactment to implement international labor treaty).
173 RAKOVE, supra note 168, at 206; see also Devins, supra note 159, at 134 (describing how
northern Federalist proponents of centralized power andJeffersonian advocates of states'
rights reversed positions when debating President Jefferson's proposed Louisiana Pur-
chase).
174 See, e.g., Tony A. Freyer, The Little Rock Confrontation and Cooper v. Aaron: Development and
Implementation of Constitutional Litigation, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 323 (2008).
175 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall ... be discharged from such Service or La-
bour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour
may be due.").
176 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. My thanks to Berkeley historian Robin Ein-
horn for pointing out this parallel.
177 Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus
State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1015, 1039 (1997).
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State Supreme Court affirmed the primacy of federal law over states'
rights claims in the Little Rock incident, 8 the antebellum Court re-
versed efforts by state courts to frustrate the return of fugitive slaves."'
A strong and judicially policed federalism ought to have a founda-
tion in constitutional politics where citizens prefer that different pub-
lic policies will prevail in different regions, based on the views of re-
gional majorities. The fundamental point of constitutional
federalism is "to allow normative disagreement amongst subordinate
units so that different units can subscribe to different value sys-
tems."' 0 Whether based on a tolerance for diversity, or despair that
certain views likely to prevail at the sub-national level will ever prevail
nationally, there is little evidence in American history or contempo-
rary politics that, with regard to strongly held views of importance to
them, Americans share this view. My claim is not that those who cur-
rently comprise the national minority do not favor decentralization.
It is true that Americans today who are "small government conserva-
tives" favor decentralization because programs to reduce taxes and
limit redistribution are currently unlikely to prevail nationally, but
the point is that Texan secessionists would be likely to cease their ef-
forts if another Reagan Revolution occurred and would be unlikely at
that point to favor policies that permit California and New York to
continue their own big government policies. The Canadian experi-
ence focuses our attention on how most Americans do not really care
about federalism in any principled way.
This does not, of course, suggest that the United States Supreme
Court must interpret our Constitution to reflect current values about
federalism, any more than current values about police practices
ought to determine the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
However, the senior member of the current majority crafting new
federalism principles, Justice Antonin Scalia, has written that judicial
doctrines "cannot displace longstanding national traditions as the
primary determinant of what the Constitution means."8' Compara-
tive analysis sharpens the realization that the American national tra-
dition is to complain about federal intervention into state preroga-
tives as a tactical matter to impede undesirable substantive policies.
Crafting judicial federalism doctrines is particularly problematic if
178 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (holding that the State of Arkansas was bound by
the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education).
179 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858) (reversing a state court's use of habeus
corpus to frustrate the return of a fugitive slave in the custody of a federal marshal).
180 Rubin & Feeley, supra note 116, at 912.
181 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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they cannot meet the aspiration of judicially manageable standards
that the Court has traditionally used to measure justiciability and
constitutional doctrine.
IV. CANADIAN IMPORTS OR AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Two Canadian constitutional doctrines would significantly facili-
tate judicial arbitration of national-state legislative boundaries in the
United States, using methods of judicial reasoning that are not unfa-
miliar to American judges. The first, variations of which have long
been suggested by American scholars,"' is the "national concern" re-
quirement that would limit congressional use of the Commerce
Clause to situations when individual state legislatures are unable to
secure a desired public policy outcome for their own citizens because
of lack of jurisdiction or a disagreement with other states. The se-
cond would police the first, by restricting congressional power under
the Commerce Clause to legislation whose "pith and substance" is the
regulation of interstate commerce; where courts determine that the
legislative purpose relates to policies not assigned by the Constitution
to the federal government, the legislation would be invalid.
A. National Concern
The authorization for Congress to regulate interstate commerce
was a specific illustration of the Constitutional Convention's general
view that the national legislature should be authorized to act in rela-
tion to "Cases to which the states are separately incompetent, or in
which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
Exercise of individual Legislation.""' Since the New Deal, it is clear
and generally undisputed that Congress has the power to enact na-
tional legislation under the Commerce Clause in two scenarios. Sce-
nario (1) is that states lack the jurisdiction to remedy problems affect-
ing their own citizens; scenario (2) occurs when state legislators are
182 See, e.g., Regan, supra note 12; Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States
Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (1934).
183 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131-32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966). The Lochner-era courts expressly rejected an interpretation of the Commerce
Clause as effectuating that general authorization. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 291-92 (1936). The majority also noted the "many subjects in respect of which
the several states have not legislated in harmony with one another, and in which their
varying laws and the failure of some of them to act at all have resulted in injurious confu-
sion and embarrassment" as an essential aspect of their outmoded view of federalism. Id.




deterred from enacting social policies deemed beneficial to their own
residents for fear of a competitive "race to the bottom" resulting from
weaker policies by other states. 8 4  If these two scenarios exhaust na-
tional legislative power in the United States, then the Court may well
improve current jurisprudence by substituting the tests required by
the Supreme Court of Canada to secure judicial approval of national
legislation under Parliament's power over peace, order, and good
185government or trade and commerce.
Something like the Canadian national concern test would be con-
sistent in result with much, but not all, of the U.S. Supreme Court's
landmark federalism jurisprudence. The early New Deal cases in-
cluded judicial reasoning suggesting that race-to-the-bottom concerns
(scenario (2)) were serious problems that justified national legisla-
tion." No individual state could regulate wheat production to ac-
184 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981) (up-
holding a federal statute limiting environmental effects from coal mining based on a
congressional finding that nationwide "surface mining and reclamation standards are es-
sential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal
produced in different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States
to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their bor-
ders" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Darby, 312 U.S. at 109-10,
123 (upholding minimum labor standards for goods produced for interstate commerce
in order to prevent competition between producers on the basis of a failure to provide
minimum standards of living necessary for health and well-being). This was not the ex-
press rationale used to justify federal labor relations legislation in Jones & Laughlin, but it
could have been. Regan, supra note 12, at 603-04. The federal interest in regulating ex-
ternalities caused by interstate water pollution was recognized in finding a justiciable
common law claim against upstream polluters, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(1972), although the Court subsequently held that federal environmental statutes
preempted the common law claim, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). In
his critique of federal legislation for failing to properly deal with state incompetence and
race-to-the-bottom concerns, a leading environmental law scholar acknowledges that the-
se two concerns provide the underlying support for federal environmental legislation.
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
2341, 2342 (1996). The text accompanying this note is intended to roughly cover all
problems that arise when events in one state cause effects in another, and bargaining or
information costs preclude the states from solving the problem through mutual coordina-
tion. See generally, Cooter & Siegel, supra note 36. To illustrate, in addition to race-to-the-
bottom concerns, California may lack incentives to solve problems where the costs are
borne intrastate and the benefits are dispersed (for example, requiring the imposition of
costly anti-pollution devices on plants located in the Mojave Desert, where the dirty air
would be blown into populated areas of Arizona and Nevada.) I would call this a lack-of-
jurisdiction problem, because Arizona and other states that would benefit from a costly
California regulation cannot impose it on Californians.
185 See supra Part l1.
186 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 36, at 160. In addition to state legislatures being deterred
from protecting their own state's workers by fear of "unfair" competition from weak-
regulating states, the Dormant Commerce Clause itself would render states with signifi-
cant purchasing power jurisdictionally incompetent by invalidating a state statute that
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complish macroeconomic goals." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States,'8 upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964's ban on racial dis-
crimination in public accommodations, could have invoked jurisdic-
tional concerns (scenario (1)) and applied the congressional find-
ings-that discrimination significantly deterred interstate travel by
African Americans "-to infer that states like California or Illinois
could not effectuate their desire to welcome black Alabama visitors
who could not get there because of a lack of accommodations in Mis-
sissippi or Tennessee.
Adopting the Canadian national concern test would be familiar to
American judges, because of its similarity to a test now used to de-
termine whether state legislation imposes an undue burden on inter-
state commerce such that it violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
When a state enacts what purports to be a legitimate, non-
discriminatory regulation to promote health, safety, or public welfare,
the American judges seek to determine whether the challenged law
either dominantly targets out-of-state persons or entities, or, instead,
whether the law's principal burdens and costs fall upon residents of
the state who have a voice in the local democratic process.'"
As Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel correctly observe, the Court's
more restrictive decisions in Lopez and Morrison are also consistent
with a national concern test.'9' Although, as with virtually any signifi-
cant intrastate activity in our modern, integrated economy, gun vio-
lence near schools and violence directed toward women have a signif-
icant effect on the entire national economy, in neither case did
congressional findings orJustice Department briefs demonstrate that
states were incompetent to criminalize gun use or provide tort law
remedies for victims of violence, nor was there evidence that states
were deterred from enacting these laws for fear that tough legislation
would harm the state by causing gun-toting individuals or domestic
batterers to relocate to a weak-regulation state.'
barred the sale of goods within the state if made out of state under substandard labor
conditions. Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59
HARV. L. Rav. 645, 647 (1946).
187 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
188 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
189 Id. at 252.
190 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8 (8th ed. 2010); see,
e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) (noting that burdens on out-
of-state interests are "unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints
normally exerted when interests within the state are affected").
191 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 36, at 163.
192 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). Inadequate state law protection for gender-related violence may be the result of
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Consistent with the argument set forth in Part IV that American
constitutional politics focuses on federalism tactically, a significant
aspect of the political and legal controversy surrounding Obamacare
was the lack of discussion as to precisely why national legislation was re-
quired.'" The challengers maintained that mandating the purchase of
a service was unprecedented and improper.94 The government did
not dispute the general argument, but asserted that health insurance
was unique because the standard way that Congress could regulate-
by barring the provision of services to those without insurance-was
not realistic: it is socially unacceptable to deny essential health care
to the uninsured when they need it.' Justice Ginsburg's dissent
alone, in two paragraphs, expressly addressed the argument that na-
tionwide imposition of Obamacare was necessary to prevent collective
action problems arising from individual state legislation.' In con-
trast, in upholding federal competition law under a national concern
discrimination rather than the sort of collective-action problems that underlie something
like the national concern test. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the more ana-
lytically sound approach to the specific issue in Morrison-a determination that hostility
or insensitivity to victims of gender-based violence led to inadequate protection under
state tort law-would be to uphold federal legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN.
L. REv. 311 (1987).
193 See Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution when Enacting the Afforda-
ble Care Act, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 261, 272-73 (2012).
194 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).
195 Id. at 2590-91.
196 Id. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("States cannot re-
solve the problem of the uninsured on their own. Like Social Security benefits, a univer-
sal health-care system, if adopted by an individual State, would be 'bait to the needy and
dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose.'" (quot-
ing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937))); see also Brief of Commonwealth of
Massachusetts as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) (noting that, in 2009, Massachusetts's
emergency rooms served thousands of uninsured, out-of-state residents). An influx of
unhealthy individuals into a state with universal health care would result in increased
spending on medical services. To cover the increased costs, a state would have to raise
taxes, and private health-insurance companies would have to increase premiums. Higher
taxes and increased insurance costs would, in turn, encourage businesses and healthy in-
dividuals to leave the state. States that undertake health-care reforms on their own thus
risk "plac[ing] themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with
neighbors or competitors." Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937); see aso
Brief of Health Care for All, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Nat'l
Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) ("[O]ut-of-state res-
idents continue to seek and receive millions of dollars in uncompensated care in Massa-
chusetts hospitals, limiting the State's efforts to improve its health care system through
the elimination of uncompensated care."). Facing that risk, individual states are unlikely
to take the initiative in addressing the problem of the uninsured, even though solving
that problem is in all states' best interests. Congress's intervention was needed to over-
come this collective-action impasse.
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prong of the trade and commerce power, the SCC explicitly inquired
into whether "the failure to include one or more provinces or locali-
ties in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation
of the scheme in other parts of the country."'
The adoption of the national concern test along with a highly def-
erential standard of judicial review, however, would not be consistent
with the current majority's desire to place a meaningful judicial limit
on the exercise of congressional power. If the demonstrated effect
on the national economy of gun violence near schools or violence
against women is insufficient-because unlimited-to justify federal
legislation, then surely a test that upholds legislation as long as Con-
gress merely has a rational basis for concluding that there is some risk
of a collective action problem would not suffice either.
On the other hand, if the U.S. Supreme Court were to adopt the
less deferential approach of the SCC, the result would be a significant
limitation on congressional power.'" This is perhaps best illustrated
by comparing American and Canadian approaches to labor and em-
ployment law and securities regulation. American courts have up-
held the Fair Labor Standards Act,' the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 00 the National Labor Relations Act,2 0' the Securities Act of
197 Gen. Motors of Can. Ltd. v. City Nat'l Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 662 (Can.). The
SCC's decision in City National Leasing upheld federal competition legislation under the
trade and commerce clause by noting that the enactment of weak competition law in any
province could impair the entire integrated Canadian economy.
198 In helpful comments on an earlier draft, Professor Robin Elliot contrasts the "very activ-
ist" posture of the British Law Lords in policing federalism with what he labels as the
"much more restrained approach" of the SCC, under "modern federalism." Whatever the
merits of the characterization of the SCC relative to the British Law Lords, and despite
some eyebrow-raising examples of modern deference, see, e.g., Reference re Anti-Inflation
Act, [1976] 2 .S.C.R. 373, 425 (Can.) (upholding price controls under POGG's emergen-
cy power because Parliament had "a rational basis for regarding the [Act] as a measure
which, in its judgment, was temporarily necessary to meet a situation of economic crisis"),
Canadian justices continue to scrutinize claims for needed federal legislation much more
closely than their American counterparts. See, e.g., Reference re Sec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R.
837 (Can.); supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
199 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. ch. 8 (2006), upheld in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
200 Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. ch. 15 (2006). Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence is apparently sufficiently settled that the Supreme Court has not had the occasion
to consider an explicit challenge to OSHA as beyond congressional power. The Supreme
Court explicitly presumed that Congress had the power to enact the Act under the Com-
merce Clause in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (listing a number
of statutes, including OSHA, as legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause
where Congress varied the extent to which it preempted state law).
201 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006), upheld in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
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1933,202 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 19340s because labor
standards, labor relations, and almost all aspects of the issuance and
trading of corporate securities have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. In contrast, the SCC has recently reaffirmed its long-
standing view that these matters are generally left to provincial regu-
lation, with federal regulation strictly limited to demonstrable areas
of provincial inability.2 4
The Canadian experience clearly demonstrates that American
states are competent to regulate in these areas, and that national uni-
formity is not a practical necessity. 2'5 Thus, if the national concern
test were to be imported, Congress's power must be justified by race-
to-the-bottom concerns. But, these concerns are only present where
(a) there is a realistic opportunity for employers to relocate their op-
erations to business-friendly states, or (b) the goods or services pro-
duced are actually sold interstate in competition with goods or ser-
vices from states that would prefer tougher regulation but whose
202 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld
federal securities regulation under the Commerce Clause in Electric Bond & Share Co. v.
SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 442 (1938) ("When Congress lays down a valid rule to govern those
engaged in transactions in interstate commerce, Congress may deny to those who violate
the rule the right to engage in such transactions.") Lower courts applied this to uphold
the Securities Act in Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1937), Bogy v. United
States, 96 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1938), and Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888 (10th
Cir. 1939).
203 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006). The Electric Bond deci-
sion was applied to uphold the Securities and Exchange Act in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1943).
204 In addition to narrowly construing the trade and commerce power, the SCC has also nar-
rowly construed the exception to provincial regulation contained in section 92(10)(a),
which permits federal regulation of "Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Tel-
egraphs, and other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or
others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province." British North
America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 92(10)(a) (U.K). Note here, there is an in-
teresting and broader textual provision allowing Parliament to declare that other in-
traprovincial "Works" can be regulated if Parliament declares them to be "for the general
Advantage of Canada." Id. Section 92(10)(c) (emphasis omitted). Even with regard to
this unique federal power to intervene and take over a legislative matter specifically as-
signed to the provinces, the SCC actively polices the exercise of that power, permitting
federal regulation over only those aspects of a "Work" declared to be for the general ad-
vantage of Canada that are "integral to the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Ont. Hydro
v. Ont. Labour Relations Bd., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327, 420-22 (Can.) (rejecting federal labor
regulation of provincially-owned nuclear power plants).
205 In contrast to limitations on federal POGG, trade and commerce, or general advantage
powers, the SCC has broadly construed the federal power over maritime law, see British
North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, section 91(10) (U.K) (assigning "Navigation
and Shipping" to Parliament), because the court determined that uniform laws were a
"practical necessity." Whitbread v. Walley, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1273, 1294 (Can.).
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businesses would be put at a competitive disadvantage, or (c) where
differential labor laws could significantly affect the mobility of labor.
There are many localized markets in the United States where
none of these scenarios is present, but where federal regulations en-
acted under the Commerce Clause currently apply. Consider the
case of Ollie's Barbecue, the Birmingham, Alabama restaurant that
unsuccessfully challenged the application of the Civil Rights Act.20
The basis for asserting federal jurisdiction was that Ollie's had pur-
207
chased $70,000 in meat from interstate sources over the past year.
Unlike the companion case involving a downtown Atlanta motel,
there was no evidence that interstate travelers frequented Ollie's es-
tablishment, or that restaurants in states where racial discrimination
in public accommodations was outlawed would be at any competitive
disadvantage. 20' Nor was there a showing that regulating Ollie's was
necessary to allow nearby restaurants that did serve interstate travel-
ers to compete.209 In short, neither scenario (1) nor scenario (2) was
present. As the Supreme Court observed, the precedential decision
in Darby upheld national minimum labor standards despite the lack
206 See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
207 Id. at 298.
208 It is true that, "while a Mom and Pop produce store may not participate in the national
market, many such businesses compete with the interstate grocery chain located nearby."
Choper, supra note 33, at 744. Although this fact supports the conclusion that almost any
commercial activity "might reasonably viewed as affecting interstate commerce," Nelson &
Pushaw, supra note 124, at 111 n.518, it does not support legislation motivated solely by
the need to solve collective action problems. For legislation's pith and substance to be
the maintenance of national goals not achievable without uniformity, Congress would
have to conclude that the Mom and Pop produce store's rivalry with chain stores is such
that failure to apply federal labor or discrimination laws to the Mom and Pop would harm
the ability of the chain store to compete. For purposes of antitrust analysis, courts have
held that Mom and Pop stores do not significantly compete with chain stores, suggesting
this finding would be difficult for Congress to make. See, e.g., California v. Am. Stores Co.,
697 F. Supp. 1125, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that "mom and pop" grocery stores do
not compete with supermarkets for grocery shopping needs), affd in part and revd in part
on other grounds, 872 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
Collective action problems could inhibit a state from ending workplace discrimination
because employers might relocate to less restrictive states, and can harm other states by
impeding the free flow of labor and capital. But the application of federal anti-
discrimination law to Ollie's Barbecue upheld in Katzenbach v. McClung cannot be justi-
fied on these grounds.
Robert Stern, who first articulated a version of the national concern test in 1934, ac-
cepts that barbers in different states do not compete, but, at least in the context of eco-
nomic downturns, would justify national minimum labor standards to fulfill the macroe-
conomic goal of boosting purchasing power. Stern, supra note 186, at 1365. While
accurate as a matter of economics, this argument, like the ones about macroeconomic ef-
fects of gun violence near schools and violence against women that have been recently re-
jected, fails to meaningfully limit federal power.
209 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 36, at 161 n.160.
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of showing that substandard wages or working conditions actually af-
fected interstate commerce. 20  Aside from those cases where prob-
lems of proof made it impossible to distinguish between intrastate ac-
tivities that caused collective actions problems and intrastate activities
that did not,2 1' a meaningful national concern test would limit the
scope of federal legislation substantially. Retail businesses serving
almost exclusively local customers would not be subject to federal dis-
crimination, labor, or consumer protection laws unless they directly
competed with rivals whose customer base subjected them to federal
regulation.
Moreover, as Cooter and Siegel allude, state legislatures are not
incompetent, nor would individual legislation disrupt American har-
mony, when two or more states can solve problems through interstate
cooperation.1  A collective action problem justifying federal inter-
vention only occurs when State One suffers the external effects of ac-
tivities within State Two and cannot easily persuade State Two to en-
act legislation to remedy the problem. Suppose a business in
Kennewick, Washington discharges mildly polluting effluents into the
Columbia River; under a meaningful national concern test, federal
legislation would only be appropriate if the Washington and Oregon
legislatures could not agree on a solution.1 Under federalism prin-
ciples of the sort practiced in Canada, Congress should defer to the
majority of Washingtonians and Oregonians if it believes, contrary to
a national majority, that the costs of barring the discharge exceeds
the environmental benefits. Under current doctrine, of course, Con-
gress has plenary authority over any navigable river," and would also
have authority if the Washington polluter made any significant pur-
210 McClung, 379 U.S. at 303 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941)).
211 Cf. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (noting that most manufacturing buisnesses do not differentiate
between goods intended for interstate and intrastate commerce during the manufactur-
ing process).
212 Cooter & Siegel, supra note 36, at 140.
213 Cf Munro v. Nat'l Capital Comm'n, [1966] S.C.R. 663 (Can.) (upholding federal legisla-
tion under the national concern test, noting failed attempts by Ontario and Quebec to
cooperate on regional planning for the bi-provincial Ottawa metropolitan area). Collec-
tive action problems are not always insuperable: sometimes parties can overcome bar-
gaining and information costs and reach desired solutions. If Ontario and Quebec had
been able to cooperate, presumably federal planning legislation would not have been
upheld if initiated simply because Parliament disagreed with the policy choices agreed to
by the provincial governments.
214 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190, 196-97 (1824) (holding that Congress's
commerce power extended to regulation over navigable waterways); see also United States
v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1967) (asserting Congress's power to control navigable
waterways in denying Fifth Amendment compensation to riparian owners).
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chases from out-of-state sellers, so that the national majority can im-
pose its will.
Nor would a meaningful national concern test permit federal leg-
islation whenever regulatory economies of scale support uniform na-
tional regulation; otherwise, like the justifications rejected in
Lopez/Morrison, there would be no meaningful limit to congressional
power. Thus, as discussed above, the SCC rejected national securities
regulation in Canada, because provinces clearly could regulate secu-
rities (as they had for many years) and there was no evidence of a
race-to-the-bottom with regard to detailed regulations.
The importation of the Canadian national concern test would
permit Congress to continue to adopt national policies where states
are incompetent to act, as well as where "individual legislation" by
American states would "interrupt" the "harmony" of the United States
because of collective action problems. Adoption of the Canadian ap-
proach reflects the view that serious collective action problems ex-
haust this category."' However, many federal laws go much further.
A realpolitik explanation for much national legislation in the United
States is neither scenario (1), state jurisdictional incompetence, nor
scenario (2), collective action problems. Rather, many aspects of
federal law in the United States are best explained as scenario (3): a
215 The SCC noted that the federal government's defense of national legislation lacked "evi-
dentiary support," in particular because "the structure and terms of the proposed Act
largely replicate the existing provincial schemes." Reference re Sec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R.
837, 887 (Can.). This suggests a modest but significant tightening of the provincial-
inability requirement from that applied in City National Leasing. Historically, because
competition law had been enacted in 1889 by the federal legislature under the criminal
law power, there was (in contrast to securities regulation) no blanket of provincial laws
designed to deter anticompetitive practices (although modest constraints were imposed
by the common law of restraint of trade and Quebec Civil Code provisions outlawing
agreements contrary to the public order). See generally Stephen F. Ross, The Evolving Tort
of Conspiray to Restrain Trade Under Canadian Common Law, 75 CANADIAN BAR REV. 193
(1996). In any case, the relative consensus of regulatory approaches among the provinces
precluded a finding of national concern: arguably, the situation would have been differ-
ent if one or more provinces decided to wreak havoc with nationwide markets by adopt-
ing radically different approaches to securities regulation. The court explicitly set forth,
as an alternative to federal regulation, cooperative intergovernmental efforts as a means
to solve problems of overlappingjurisdiction. Sec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. at 866 (citing with
approval F~ddration des producteurs de volailles du Quebec v. Pelland, [2005] 1 S.C.R.
292 (Can.) (upholding a comprehensive scheme for chicken production and marketing
created by agreement between the federal and provincial governments)).
216 For federal legislation to properly address a subject of "national concern," it must possess
an "'indivisibility' that distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern; this property
can be established by determining the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial
failure to regulate the intra-provincial aspects of the matter effectively." Sujit Choudhry,
Recasting Social Canada: A Reconsideration of Federal jurisdiction over Social Policy, 52 U.
TORONTO LJ. 163, 228-29 (2002).
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national majority and its federal representatives believe that state legis-
latures are insufficiently sensitive to solving widespread problems that affect
Americans throughout the country, because of hostility to regional minorities,
special-interest capture, or basic philosophical disagreement with the national
majority. It is this third scenario, rather than the first two, that ex-
plains the application of the Civil Rights Act to employers or retailers
unlikely to relocate to another state that permits discrimination on
the basis of race or gender," or the Federal Trade Commission Act
to unfair and deceptive anti-consumer practices in intrastate transac-
tions of specific industries (such as abusive practices in the funeral
industry),2 " again by sellers unlikely to relocate on the basis of the
regulatory environment. In contrast, these issues are all dealt with
provincially in Canada. Canadians do not believe that the sincere
perception by a national majority of a widespread problem that needs
fixing in a particular way is a sufficient justification for federal inter-
vention, just because some provincial governments do not share this
view.
B. Pith and Substance
Judicially policed constitutional federalism requires courts to pre-
vent the national government from enacting legislation simply be-
cause they believe that "some such policy as that adopted ... should
be made general throughout" the nation. 8  Indeed, this view was
shared by Chief Justice Marshall, despite his expansive definition of
217 Several American advocates for something like the national concern test seek to cabin
private racial discrimination of the sort that was prohibited, in the exercise of the com-
merce power, by the Civil Rights Act and upheld in McClung. Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964); see, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 36, at 161; Regan, supra
note 12, at 595-602. This is true enough, if one believes that a federal ban on Ollie's
Barbecue's racist practices is an exception because Alabama's tolerance of segregated res-
taurants was itself a failure to provide the equal protection of the common law. Id. Or
somewhat more broadly, that racial discrimination is a singular exception to the national
concern principle (in which case, Congress could properly legislate against private con-
duct as a badge or incident of slavery in enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment,Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968)). The assertion here, however, is that a
national majority is just as concerned about protecting economically powerless workers,
women, Americans with disabilities, and senior citizens, as they are with protecting Afri-
can Americans, while only the latter can be protected under legislation enforcing the
Thirteenth Amendment.
218 FTC Funeral Industry Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 453.1(i) (2012).
219 Cf In re Bd. of Commerce Act, 1919, & the Combines & Fair Prices Act, 1919, [1922] 1
A.C. 191, 200-01 (U.KP.C.) (explicitly rejecting this justification for parliamentary legis-
lation in Canada); see also Regan, supra note 12, at 571 (explaining that the general inter-
ests of union do not include "just anything Congress thinks would be desirable for the
people of the United States as a whole").
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the scope of federal legislative power.220 In the shadow ofjudicial po-
licing of constitutional federalism, federal legislators motivated by a
desire to set policies for the entire nation in areas that the Constitu-
tion assigns to sub-national governments will enact legislation that
formally relates to a matter within its enumerated authority. As de-
211
scribed above, Canadian courts use the pith and substance doctrine
to police this problem; since the New Deal, American courts have
not.
The recent American decisions limiting the scope of congression-
al power under the Commerce Clause all concerned legislation that
was justified under precedents that allowed Congress to regulate in-
trastate activities that substantially affected interstate commerce.
The national concern test, however, would also require a reconsider-
ation of even longer-standing precedents that allowed Congress to
exercise plenary authority to regulate instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, even when the regulation did nothing to secure any legit-
imate purposes related to the instrumentality, but was intended in-
stead to accomplish the regulation of public morals. The original
and revised Mann Act illustrates the effect of a meaningful national
concern test policed with the pith and substance doctrine. The orig-
inal act, prohibiting the transportation of women across state lines for
immoral purposes, was upheld under the view that the pith and sub-
stance of a federal statute regulating interstate transportation did not
need to be the protection of interstate commercial instrumentalities
or the facilitation of interstate commerce.2 The revised statute bars
the interstate transportation of a person for the purposes of engaging
in sexual conduct that is otherwise illegal.2 The latter statute's pith
and substance is to solve a collective action problem: how State X can
220 Although the Court rejected the claim that Congress could only legislate under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause when the challenged law was, in the opinion of the Justices,
demonstrably necessary, M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), the
Chief Justice cautioned that were Congress "under the pretext of executing its powers,
[to] pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal" to invalidate the law. Id. at 423; see ao
Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a Principled Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 31, 39 (1998).
221 See supra text accompanying notes 103-13.
222 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012); United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995).
223 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). The foundational precedent was Cham-
pion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding the ban on interstate
transportation of lottery tickets).
224 See Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628 § 5(b)(1), 100
Stat. 3511. A similar approach is advocated by Regan, supra note 12, at 576-77.
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enforce morality laws on its citizens when they can travel to State Y to
engage in immoral activity? Without the pith and substance doctrine,
there are few legislative matters beyond Congress's reach,25 and the
current majority's desire for a workable doctrine that meaningfully
distinguishes between national and local legislation will fail.
The absence of the equivalent of the Canadian pith and substance
doctrine in the United States reflects the different constitutional poli-
tics north and south of the largest undefended border in the world.
The broad application of many federal statutes to situations in which
collective action problems would not preclude individual state legisla-
tion reflects a persistent, bipartisan, and long-standing political pref-
erence to establish national policy because of a concern that one or
more states will adopt policies that ill-serve their own constituents
(scenario (3)). With popular support from national majorities, Con-
gress has passed legislation to protect workers and racial minorities
across the country from exploitation and discrimination, not solely or
even primarily because of concerns about the effects in their own
states; rather, national majorities believe that a policy of non-
discrimination is desirable and should be enforced in states where
regional majorities disagree. A significant motivation for maintaining
the federal criminalization of marijuana is not the concern that mari-
juana grown for medical use in California or for general use in Wash-
ington or Colorado will flood other states, but rather because a na-
tional majority still thinks marijuana legalization is a bad idea.
These illustrations reflect a widespread view that federal legislation
should not be limited to scenario (1), state jurisdictional incompe-
tence, or scenario (2), collective action problems that would result in
225 Choper, supra note 33, at 760. Professors Grant Nelson and Robert Pushaw argue that
modern-day federal politicians frequently controvert the Framers' intent that "national
uniformity is good in commerce but bad in political, social, cultural, and moral matters."
See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 124, at 113. Thus, they believe that the Supreme Court
should "strike down attempts to invoke the Commerce Clause to legislate social or cultur-
al norms based upon Congress's disagreement with the states' treatment of particular
problems." Id. at 118. Yet they conclude that "so long as Congress is regulating a com-
mercial transaction, it is immaterial whether there is some other legislative purpose (even
an overriding one)." Id. at 125. The Canadian experience suggests that this does not
provide the limitation that the current majority seeks. To provide a workable means to
preserve this divide, American Justices need to adopt something like the Canadian test of
pith and substance.
226 Justice Benjamin Cardozo upheld federal pensions for senior citizens by noting that states
were reluctant to tax and spend for their own pension schemes for fear of competitive
harm to local industries, rather than "owing... to the lack of sympathetic interest."
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937). Often, however, state legislatures
fail to act in the way that a national majority prefers precisely because of a "lack of sympa-
thetic interest." Id.
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a race-to-the-bottom. Rather, persistent American national majorities
seem to believe that if individuals wish to use instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce (like rivers or highways), or engage in interstate
commerce (buy buying some out-of-state products), then national
legislation is justifiable. This was, indeed, one of the rationales of
child labor legislation struck down in Hammer v. Dagenhart.m" If the
U.S. Supreme Court is to intervene to overrule this political judg-
ment, it not only needs to adopt a meaningful and workable stand-
ard, like the national concern test, but it also must ensure that the
test is not evaded on pretext.
To ensure a workable and analytically sound judicial policing of
American federalism, the U.S. Supreme Court could also borrow the
Canadian technique of limiting federal intervention under the
Commerce Clause to legislation intended to resolve scenarios (1) and
(2), but not (3). Adoption of this technique would modify the
Court's traditional deferential inquiry as to whether Congress could
rationally find jurisdictional incompetence or collective action prob-
lems. Application of the doctrine would likely require that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act be read nar-
rowly, so that the statutory requirement that regulates businesses
would be engaged in activities "affecting commerce" would be con-
strued to mean that state regulation would result in a race to the bot-
tom. A similar narrowing approach would be required for many oth-
er federal statutes.
C. Would MeaningfulJudicial Arbitration Give American judges Too Much
Discretion?
An overriding concern for American constitutional law is with
doctrinal standards that allow unelected judges to make policy.m
There seems to be widespread evidence that Canada's standards for
judicial arbitration of federalism disputes afford justices a significant
amount of unconstrained discretion. The SCC has acknowledged
227 247 U.S. 251, 271-73 (1918). The other rationale was to solve the collective action prob-
lem caused by unfair interstate competition between products manufactured in states
with limits on child labor and those without them. Hamme/s conclusion that the Com-
merce Clause did not give Congress the power to prevent this unfair competition was
overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).
228 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining
about judicially created equal protection doctrines that require closer scrutiny to certain
classifications "when it seems like a good idea to load the dice"); see Jesse H. Choper, The
Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1470 (2005) (asking
whether a judicial standard is "sufficiently principled to guide the lower courts and con-
strain all jurists from inserting their own ideological beliefs in ad hoc, unreasoned ways").
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that courts "apply considerations of policy along with legal principle"
in determining whether a law is a matter within the jurisdiction of the
government that enacted it.22" Even when applying legal principles,
some are stated at such a broad level of generalization as to scarcely
limit judicial discretion; thus, the process of characterizing a statute
as falling within or without a particular power allocated to the federal
or provincial governments under the BNA Act requires the courts to
"inquire into the social or economic purposes which the statute was
enacted to achieve. 2' 0 Although eschewing the use of discretion to
uphold or reject a statute based on the substantive policy goals con-
tained therein, Professor Hogg suggests that the "policy" comes down
to a judicial determination of whether the challenged statute is "the
kind of law that should be enacted at the federal or the provincial
level."2 ' In making this determination, Professor William R. Leder-
man wrote that courts need to consider multiple criteria, including
the value of uniformity versus diversity, the relative merits of local or
central administration, and the justice of minority claims. 2 More re-
cently, Justice Marie Deschamps wrote for a unanimous bench in ob-
serving that "the characteristic features of federalism may vary from
one judge to another, and will be based on political rather than legal
notions."2 " The lack of standards led Paul Weiler to analogize the
SCC's role to that of a labor interest arbitrator.2 4 Indeed, the
breadth of the role Canadians assume for their judges is illustrated in
Professor Hogg's analysis that the reserved powers of the Governor
General (the formal representative of the Queen), to be exercised in
229 R. v. Morgentaler (Morgantaler Ill), [1993] 3S.C.R. 463, 481 (Can.).
230 Id. at 483 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 1 HOGG, supra note 37,
§ 15.5(d).
231 1 HOGG, supra note 37, § 15.5(h) (citing W.R. LEDERMAN, CONTINUING CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS: ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, PUBLIC LAW AND
FEDERAL SYSTEM OF CANADA 241 (1981)).
232 LEDERMAN, supra note 231, at 241.
233 Reference re Emp't Ins. Act, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, 678 (Can.). A recent computer-based
search revealed little Canadian commentary on what is, to an American eye, a remarkable
quote. A prominent Canadian politican, who had earlier served as a constitutional advis-
er to the leader of the right-wing Reform Party, has cited this language to argue against
the dominant form of purposive judicial interpretation in Canada. Scott Reid, The Persons
Case Eight Decades Later: Reappraising Canada's Most Misunderstood Court Ruling, CONST.
DAY, http://constitutionday.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/charter-essay october
2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2014). A Canadian constitutional law scholar cites it as evi-
dence to critique arguments for more open-ended judicial balancing that characterizes
some aspects of Canadian federalism jurisprudence. Hoi Kong, The Forms and Limits of
Federalism Doctrine, 13 REv. CONST. STUD. 241, 265 (2008).
234 PAUL WEILER, IN THE LAST RESORT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
174 (1974).
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time of constitutional crisis when the Prime Minister lacks the confi-
dence of the majority of the elected House of Commons, "is some-
what akin to that of a judge-another non-elected official to whom
we readily entrust large powers in the expectation that they will be
exercised impartially." 235
Justices of all stripes seek to create constitutional doctrine that is
both analytically sound (according to their own jurisprudence) and
workable for application by lower courts. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is unlimited in its textual
scope and the concept that statutes should afford equal protection is
conceptually sound, but the U.S. Supreme Court has confined active
judicial policing to those situations where legislation that is unfairly
discriminatory is unlikely to be corrected in the political process. In
Vance v. Bradley,' the Court observed that the "Constitution pre-
sumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and
that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how
unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." 2
Two Canadian constitutional doctrines could be borrowed by
American judges to police federalism. Both reflect a workable effort
to achieve the current majority's goal of a judicially arbitrable means
to effectuate a modern-day distinction between limited federal power
and unlimited state power. Limiting federal authority to non-
pretextual remedies for (1) state jurisdictional incompetence or (2)
external harms caused by individual state legislation resulting from
collective action problems seems, as well, to be analytically sounder
than limiting federal authority to anything that affects our completely
integrated national economy as long as federal lawyers can imagine
some limiting principles to identify some morsel of state autonomy
untouched by the statute.
However, importing Canadian doctrines requires a significant re-
vision of American constitutional politics. The national concern and
pith and substance doctrines significantly limit the ability of the
American people, through their national representatives, to effectu-
ate public policies that promote the general welfare when the need
for national legislation is due to the disagreement between state legis-
235 1 HOGG, supra note 37, § 9.7(a).
236 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
237 Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
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lative majorities and the national majority. Debates over major na-
tional legislation, from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, through
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, to the Affordable Care Act of 2009, all show heated disagree-
ment about the substantive merits of the legislation, but relatively lit-
tle concern that these measures should be limited to overriding
weaker state laws with external effects. Rather, these major pieces of
legislation reflect the national judgment that Americans should not
be subjected to exploitive and unfair workplace conditions, racial and
gender-based discrimination, unreasonable obstacles in overcoming
disabilities, and avoidance of the ravages of expensive and unafforda-
ble health care, whether or not their own state legislatures could pro-
tect them, and whether or not their own state legislatures would be
deterred from protecting them by the threat of weak regulation from
other states.
To continue the current doctrinal path provides little in the way
of restraining Congress. To adopt meaningful standards fundamen-
tally alters American constitutional politics, making our federation
more similar to our northern cousin. This is the choice of constitu-
tional law and politics facing the United States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The United States and Canada are both federal systems, with the
constitutional assignment of specific powers to the national legisla-
ture and independent judiciaries that have the final say in questions
of legislative conformance to a written constitution. Both constitu-
tions were drafted to permit the federal legislature to act in cases
where (1) sub-national governments lack jurisdictional competence
or (2) national uniformity is essential to effectuate public policy. In
Canada, Parliament-authorizing provisions have been narrowly con-
strued by judges to limit federal legislation to where these two scenar-
ios demonstrably exist. In the United States, Congress-authorizing
provisions have, since the New Deal, been broadly construed byjudg-
es to permit federal legislation that establishes a national policy, with
which some state legislatures may disagree on the policy merits,
whenever Congress reasonably believes that the legislation affects
economic relations not entirely internal to a single state.
The virtually complete integration of the American economy,
however, means that there is virtually no intrastate activity that, in the
aggregate, does not have the requisite interstate effect. Recent deci-
sions claim to impose new limits, but they fail to limit Congress's abil-
ity in any meaningful way to national problems arising out ofjuisdic-
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tional or collective action problems. If American Justices seek doc-
trines that are both workable and analytically sound, they could bor-
row from Canada, insisting on a close judicial review of federal stat-
utes to ensure that they address truly "national concerns" and that
they are not pretexts for federal laws that seek to override policy
judgments by state legislative majorities with which federal legislators
disagree. However, adoption of these workable doctrines would re-
sult in a significant change in American constitutional politics and
law.
Even in Canada, observers recognize that their tests, while worka-
ble, afford a very high degree of discretion to unelected judges. The
resolution of intergovernmental disputes by a politically unresponsive
arbiter is seen as desirable, however, in light of the inability of the
Canadian political process to adequately protect the interests of Ca-
nadians in maintaining provincial rights. This is due to the realities
of parliamentary politics (strong party discipline inhibits the "faction
against faction" political constraint Madison accurately foresaw be-
tween federal and state politicians in the United States), and the par-
ticular demographics of Canada, where a permanent linguistic mi-
nority is a permanent linguistic majority in the second largest
province. Active judicial arbitration of Canadian federalism im-
portantly reflects a widely shared view, historically and today, that
Canadians prefer to ensure that important economic, social, and cul-
tural policies they prefer are enacted in their own provinces, even if
what they perceive as misguided policies are imposed on their fellow
Canadians in other provinces.
In interpreting broadly worded provisions relating to constitu-
tional rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has been extremely cognizant
that its role varies not only with text and original intent but with the
need for judicial intervention to effectuate constitutional values. The
widespread judicial discretion required to meaningfully distinguish
what is national and what is local, and the widely shared view, histori-
cally and today, that Americans aspire to enact important economic,
social, and cultural policies they prefer for the entire country, even if
what they perceive as misguided policies might be favored by a major-
ity in one or more states, suggests that the Court may reject, as inap-
propriate to our own condition, the more restrictive approach adopt-
ed by our cousins in Ottawa.
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